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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-School
Authorities May Prohibit High School Student's
Distribution of Sex Questionnaire to Prevent
Possible Psychological Harm to Other Students
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff, editor of a high school publication,' brought suit in
federal court 2 seeking an order compelling defendant school officials3
to allow the student publication to distribute a sex questionnaire,
to students in the high school and to publish the results.5 Plaintiff
claimed that defendants had not shown that the planned distribution would disrupt school activities and that, therefore, defendants'
prohibition of the questionnaire violated 42 U.S.C. § 19831 and the
first and fourteenth amendments. 7 Pointing to potential psychological harm to students, defendants argued that the state's interest in
protecting the students' emotional well-being outweighed plaintiffs
interest in distributing the questionnaire. The trial court held that
1. Plaintiff attended Stuyvesant High School in New York City and was editor of The
Stuyvesant Voice, a student publication.
2. Plaintiff, suing individually and by his father, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
3. Defendants were the Chancellor of New York City Public Schools, the members of
the Board of Education, the Administrator of Student Affairs for the Board of Education,
and the principal of Stuyvesant High School.
4. Plaintiff proposed a random distribution of the questionnaire on school grounds. The
questionnaire consisted of 25 questions and covered topics such as contraception, homosexuality, masturbation, and the extent of students' sexual experience. The questionnaire included a proposed cover letter describing the nature and purpose of the survey. It emphasized
the importance of honest answers but advised the students that "[y]ou are not required to
answer any of the questions and if you feel particularly uncomfortable-don't push yourself."
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff intended to collect the
answers anonymously and keep the answers confidential.
5. Plaintiff planned to tabulate the results of the survey and to publish them in an
article in the student publication. Plaintiff intended to attempt to interpret the results in the
article.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
7. The first amendment provides that Congress "shall make no law. . . abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The fourteenth amendment makes this proscription applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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defendants could prohibit distribution of the questionnaire to ninthand tenth-grade students but not to eleventh- and twelfth-grade
students.8 On appeal9 to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held, reversed in part'0 and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. If school officials reasonably believe
that distribution on school grounds of a high school student's questionnaire soliciting information about the sexual habits of his fellow
students might cause psychological harm to other students, then
prohibition of the questionnaire does not violate the right to freedom
of expression of the student seeking to distribute the questionnaire.
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The degree to which school authorities may limit high school
student expression on school grounds is a recurring first amendment
problem. Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, school authorities
traditionally acted in the place of parents when children were on
school grounds," making courts reluctant to overturn discretionary
actions by school officials 2 unless such actions were clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. 3 Some courts granted a strong presumption
as
of authority to school board rules" and at times characterized
5
officials.1
school
by
acts
abusive
clearly
reasonable even
8. The court noted that the district court evidently found a strong possibility that
distribution of the questionnaire would result in significant psychological harm to ninth- and
tenth-grade students. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d at 519. The district court concluded,
however, that psychological and educational benefits from the questionnaire outweighed any
harm to eleventh- and twelfth-grade students. By agreement of the parties, the district court
based its decision upon the briefs and upon affidavits of the parties and their expert witnesses. Id. at 515.
9. On appeal both parties agreed that defendants' prohibition of students' efforts to
collect and distribute information and ideas involved rights protected by the first amendment. Id. at 516.
10. The court reversed the district court's order insofar as it restrained defendants from
prohibiting distribution of the questionnaire to eleventh- and twelfth-grade students. Id. at
520.
11. See note 32 infra. See generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board
Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U.
PA. L. REv. 373, 377-402 (1969). Courts have long recognized the right of parents to direct
the upbringing and education of their children. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (liberty interest of parents to control upbringing and education of their children);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (power of parents to control education of their
children).
12. See note 28 infra.
13. See Kissick v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); 54
MINN. L. Rav. 721, 722-23 (1970); 45 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1278, 1284 (1970).
14. See State v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (Ct. C.P. 1962).
15. See Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 148 P. 959 (1915) (court held
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In the 1960's, however, the federal courts increasingly scrutinized school authorities' efforts to restrict students' freedom of expression. In two Fifth Circuit cases, Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Board of Education" and Burnside v. Byars,'7 authorities in allblack high schools suspended students who violated a regulation
that prohibited the wearing of "freedom buttons." 8 Balancing the
interests involved, the court stated that if the conduct in question
materially and substantially interferes with the effective operation
of the school, the state's interest in maintaining an orderly school
system outweighs the students' right to express themselves. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the Burnside students' claim that school officials had violated their rights to freedom of expression because the
buttons attracted only "mild curiosity,"' 9 but the court found no
infringement of first amendment rights in Blackwell because students wearing the buttons disrupted school activities."
In the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District,2 ' the Supreme Court agreed that high school students have a positive, though limited, 2 constitutional right to express themselves on school grounds. Pursuant to a school board
regulation prohibiting the wearing of armbands in public schools,2 3
school officials suspended three students 4 for wearing black armbands in protest of American involvement in Vietnam. Alleging
violation of their first amendment rights to freedom of expression,
the students brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 to enjoin
their suspension. The Court held that wearing black armbands to
symbolize a political grievance was "closely akin to 'pure speech' "28
and therefore fell within the protection of the first amendment.
Citing Burnside, the majority reasoned that in order to restrict stu"reasonable" the suspension of a student for criticizing the school board for maintaining an
unsafe school building).
16. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
17. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
18. The "freedom buttons" were small buttons that supported civil rights. Id. at 746,
750.
19. Id. at 748.
20. The students wearing buttons attempted to force them on other students. Id. at 751.
21. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
22. The Court stated that first amendment rights, "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment," extend to high school students. Id. at 506.
23. The school authorities adopted the regulation prohibiting the wearing of armbands
after learning that a group of adults and their children intended to wear black armbands
during the Christmas holiday season. Id. at 504.
24. Two of the students were high school students, and the third attended junior high
school. Id.
25. See note 6 supra.
26. 393 U.S. at 505.
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dents' freedom of speech without transgressing first amendment
guarantees, school authorities must reasonably forecast
"substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."r2 The Court emphasized that mere fear of disturbance does
not justify restriction of student expression.2s Although the Court
stated that a reasonable forecast of "invasion of the rights of others"2 9 also may justify limitation of students' expression, it did not
base its holding on this language.
After Tinker lower federal courts actively scrutinized freedom
of expression claims by high school students, and most courts refused to accept untested assertions by high school officials that
student expression would provoke material or substantial disruption
of school discipline. In Breen v. Kahl" a high school student sued
to enjoin his suspension for violating a school regulation governing
hair length. The Seventh Circuit held the regulation unconstitutional, reasoning that the first or the ninth amendment protected
the student's right to wear his hair as he wished3 and that in certain
matters school authorities must share their control over school discipline with students' parents.32 The court emphasized that in order
27. Id. at 514.
28. Noting the controversial nature of free speech, the Court asserted:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation
may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says
we must take this risk . . . ; and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous
freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive,
often disputatious, society.
Id. at 508-09. Despite its holding the Court nevertheless recognized the need for comprehensive control of conduct in the schools by school officials. The Court stated that it had upheld
repeatedly the authority of school officials, consistent with constitutional safeguards, to control student conduct on school grounds. Id. at 507.
29. Id. at 513.
30. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
31. The court asserted that the student's right fell either within the "penumbras" of
the first amendment freedom of speech or within the ninth amendment as an additional
fundamental right that exists alongside the fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight amendments. Id. at 1036.
32. The court noted:
[Tihe doctrine invoked by the School Board of "in loco parentis" does not bolster
its discipline argument. Although schools need to stand in place of a parent, in regard
to certain matters during the school hours, the power must be shared with the parents,
especially over intimately personal matters such as dress and grooming. Since the students' parents agree with their children that their hair can be worn long and because it
would be impossible to comply with the long hair regulation during school hours and
follow the wishes of the students and their parents outside of school, in the absence of
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to justify a restriction on plaintiffs right to wear long hair, school
authorities must meet a substantial burden of demonstrating that
33
plaintiffs hair caused disruption in the school.
Subsequent federal court decisions have continued the trend of
protecting students' rights to freedom of expression unless school
officials show that the expression involved will substantially disrupt
school discipline.3 4 The Seventh Circuit, in Scoville v. Board of
3 5 prohibited school officials from censoring high school
Education,
students' "underground" newspaper 6 because the school officials
objected solely to the content of the newspaper's critical editorial.
Acknowledging the editorial's "disrespectful and tasteless attitude
toward authority, '37 the court nevertheless held that the school officials had not met their burden of proof under the Tinker standard
since they could not have reasonably forecast that publication and
distribution of the newspaper containing the editorial would substantially disrupt school procedures or invade the rights of other
3
students. 1.
any showing of disruption, the doctrine of "in loco parentis" has no applicability.
Id. at 1037-38.
33. To define the state's substantial burden of justification, the court quoted from
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968):
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
34. Most courts confronted with restrictions imposed on student expression because
school officials objected to the content of the expression have upheld students' right to express
themselves, absent actual disruption of school activities. See, e.g., Shanley v. Northeast Ind.
School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (school officials cannot restrain distribution of
school newspaper containing information on birth control); Butts v. Dallas Ind. School Dist.,
436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding students' rights to wear black armbands); Bayer v.
Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975) (school
officials cannot prohibit distribution of school newspapers containing birth control information); Aguirre v. Tahoka Ind. School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (upholding
students' rights to wear armbands); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (right
of students to refuse to stand or leave classroom during daily pledge of allegiance); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding students' rights to publish in their
school newspaper a paid advertisement opposing the Vietnamese war).
35. 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
36. The students wrote their newspaper, Grass High, off the school premises and distributed 60 copies to faculty and students at a price of 15 cents per copy. The newspaper
contained poetry, essays, movie and record reviews, and a critical editorial. Id. at 11.
37. Id. at 14. The editorial imputed a "sick mind" to the dean of the school, id., and
urged students to refuse to deliver to parents any "propaganda" issued by the school. Id. at
12. The newspaper also contained the random statement "Oral sex may prevent tooth decay."
Id. at 14.
38. When high school officials have demonstrated that students' expression caused or

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:173

Other courts have been less willing to recognize secondary students' rights to freedom of expression and have applied a rational
basis test to the control of student expression by school officials. In
Katz v. McAulay,35 for example, the Second Circuit examined the
constitutionality of school officials' threats to expel students who
distributed on school grounds leaflets soliciting funds in violation of
a New York Board of Regents' rule.4" Although the evidence disclosed minimum potential interference4 with school discipline, the
court rejected the students' request for anticipatory relief against
enforcement of the rule on the ground that the rule was reasonable
and had a rational relationship to the orderly operation of the educational system.42 Prior to the instant decision, however, no court
had held that the first amendment permits school authorities to
restrict high school students' freedom of expression solely because
the expression might cause psychological harm to other students.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant court initially sought to identify the appropriate
standard for determining whether defendants' prohibition of the sex
questionnaire violated the first amendment. Although the court recognized that the potential disruption in this case was psychological
rather than physical, it nevertheless determined that the proper test
was whether defendants had demonstrated reasonable cause to believe that the questionnaire would have caused significant psychological harm to some students.4 3 Focusing next on whether defenwould cause violence or physical disruption of school activities, however, courts have upheld
disciplinary action by school officials. Thus in Hernandez v. School Dist. Number One, 315
F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970), the district court held that, under Tinker, the first amendment
does not protect the wearing of black berets by high school students if such conduct interferes

with school order or invades the rights of other students. In Hernandez the evidence disclosed
that the wearers of the black berets engaged in boisterous conduct, bullied other students,

disobeyed teachers, and created an atmosphere of tension and apprehension in the school.
39.

438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972).

40. The New York Board of Regents' rule prohibited "soliciting funds from the pupils
in the public schools." Id. at 1059.
41. Id. at 1061.
42. Id. The court reasoned that allowing solicitation in this case could expose students
to "literally dozens of organizations" importuning students to seek contributions for them.
Id. The court further reasoned that pressure groups within the student body soliciting funds
for these organizations could foreseeably resort to threats and violence to obtain contributions.
43. In a footnote the court distinguished the instant facts from cases holding that school
officials could not restrain the distribution of school newspapers containing birth control
information. See note 34 supra. The court reasoned that the questionnaire did not seek to
convey information; instead, it sought to obtain information in a manner that could cause
psychological harm. The court further stated that defendants could have a legitimate concern
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dants had met this burden," the court noted defendants' knowledge
and experience in educational matters and stated that federal
courts should not intervene in such matters when a rational basis
exists for school authorities' actions. Because of the imprecision of
psychological diagnoses, defendants' experts' affidavits failed to
predict with certainty that a specific number of students would
suffer psychological harm. The court nevertheless concluded that
defendants had a rational basis for believing that distribution of the
questionnaire on school grounds might result in significant psychological harm to some students. Consequently, defendants' decision
to prohibit distribution of the questionnaire did not violate plaintiff's freedom of expression.45
The dissent" charged the majority with overextending the
phrase "invasion of the rights of others"4 to justify the drastic censorship that defendants had imposed. Although the dissent approved abridgment of students' speech when the expression might
result in physical violence, it rejected fear of possible psychological
harm to some students as too vague a justification for restricting
students' first amendment rights.48 The dissent further asserted that
even if the majority's standard is proper, defendants failed to meet
about the proposed article, which would attempt to make conclusions about the results of
the survey.
44. In support of their argument that the questionnaire could cause serious psychological damage to some students, defendants submitted affidavits from four experts in the fields
of psychology and psychiatry, two of whom were employed by the mental health agency of
the New York City school system. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d at 517-18. Plaintiff submitted affidavits from five experts, one of whom was plaintiff's father. Id. at 518-19.
45. In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that the school officials' action was
principally a measure to protect students under their care instead of a curtailment of plaintiff's first amendment rights. Id. at 519-20.
In a concurring opinion Judge Gurfein initially noted the importance of protecting students against psychological harm. Second, he recommended that in areas of dispute among
psychiatrists, federal courts should allow professional educators to resolve problems relating
to students. Finally, the concurring opinion emphasized the distinction drawn by the majority
between newspapers containing birth control information and questionnaires, see note 43
supra, in order to prevent the majority opinion from serving as "an unintended precedent in
derogation of [a] First Amendment right." 563 F.2d at 520.
46. Judge Mansfield wrote in dissent. Id. at 520-27.
47. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
48. The dissent emphasized that the majority's standard posed a grave threat to freedom of speech in high schools. The dissent failed to find a significant legal distinction between
Shanley and Bayer and the instant facts. See notes 34 & 43 supra. According to the dissent,
school officials could use the court's holding to bar distribution of a broad range of other
materials on school premises because of possible psychological harm. The dissent further
noted: "A public school's premises are the 'very marketplace of ideas' where personal intercommunication between students, in or out of the classroom, is 'an important part of the
educational process' even though some students may experience a degree of mental trauma
in the process." 563 F.2d at 521.
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their burden of demonstrating that the risk of psychological harm
outweighed plaintiff's right to freedom of expression." Although
admitting that the questionnaire might harm some students, the
dissent nevertheless contended that the outcome of the case should
depend upon the effect of the questionnaire on the average student.
Applying this standard, the dissent concluded that defendants
failed to demonstrate any reasonable likelihood of substantial psychological harm to an appreciable number of students.
IV.

COMMENT

The Second Circuit's application of a rational basis test to a
student's free speech claim demonstrates its unwillingness to follow
the analysis laid down by Tinker for determining the degree of control that the first amendment allows school officials to exercise over
student expression. Tinker and subsequent lower court cases required school authorities to show actual or potential physical disruption of school activities in order to restrict student expression on
school grounds. Under the instant court's test, however, school authorities may limit students' freedom of expression merely by showing potential psychological harm to some students. The court's test
thus allows school officials to circumvent the Tinker standard in
almost all free speech cases.
Because the burden of proof under the Second Circuit's test is
easier to meet than the burden imposed by Tinker and because
experts cannot predict and evaluate psychological harm with precision, school authorities conceivably could regulate any student expression they deem objectionable by finding experts to testify that
the expression at issue would cause psychological harm to at least
some students." Although the instant court attempted to distinguish the distribution of sex questionnaires from the distribution of
49. The dissent first emphasized the importance of permitting high school students to
exercise their first amendment rights, and thereby learn greater appreciation for the value
and meaning of the Bill of Rights. Maintaining that the statements in the affidavits submitted by the defendants were conclusory, the dissent next criticized these affidavits for assuming that students with fragile sensibilities not only would read the questionnaire but also
would make a concentrated effort to answer it, despite the warning of the cover letter. The
dissent reviewed the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff and pointed to some of the positive
aspects of the questionnaire. The dissent contended that the survey would provide the students with genuine information about sex, making many of them more secure in their sexual
identities. Finally, arguing that sex and sexual stimuli permeate the environment of these
New York City high school students, the dissent concluded that no reasonable likelihood of
substantial psychological harm to an appreciable number of students existed.
50. For example, school authorities could suppress a student's criticism of the safety
features of a school building if they could find experts to testify that psychological damage
to other students might result. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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other sexual literature,5 ' the distinction is unpersuasive under the
court's test since distributing sexually-related information arguably
could cause as much psychological harm to high school students as
soliciting such information. Publishing in a school newspaper the
results of a national survey of high school students' sexual habits
probably would affect students as much as would the questionnaire
and the proposed article in the instant case. 52 Such potential for
extreme regulation of student expression contradicts Tinker's interpretation of high school students' rights to express themselves and
allows school officials to chill freedom of expression on high school
grounds by couching their objections to student expression in terms
of psychological harm.
The court might have avoided providing a means to circumvent
the Tinker standard by replacing Tinker's disruption analysis with
an analysis that focuses on the interest of parents in directing the
education and upbringing of their children." Such parental interest
presumably includes the control of the intellectual intake of children even though a child's desires might contradict those of his
parents." In Tinker the school authorities sought to prevent physical disruption caused by students' reactions to black armbands, but
in the instant case the student expression threatened no physical
disruption. Therefore, instead of applying the Tinker standard, the
instant court should have directed plaintiff to send the questionnaires to the parents of each child chosen to participate in the
survey so that the parents could read the questions and decide what
would be best for their children. In response to plaintiffs freedom
of expression claim, the court could have reasoned that defendants
were restricting plaintiff's freedom of expression only to the extent
that the parents of other students desired. The court then could
have upheld prohibition of the questionnaire on the ground that the
interest of parents in regulating the intellectual intake of their chil51.
52.

See note 43 supra.
Courts conceivably could employ the Second Circuit's test to restrict student ex-

pression in circumstances similar to those in Tinker. For example, the Supreme Court in
Tinker could have reached the opposite result because the school authorities reasonably could
have concluded that the wearing of black armbands might have caused psychological harm
to some high school students.
53. See note 11 supra.
54. The Supreme Court has recognized this parental interest even when children's first
amendment rights are affected. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held
that the state could not constitutionally compel Amish parents to keep their children in
public high schools to age 16. Writing in dissent, Justice Douglas pointed out that the majority, by allowing a religious exemption to the parents without consulting the students about

their religious preferences, imposed the parents' choice of religion on their children, who were
mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires. Id. at 241-46.
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dren outweighed plaintiffs right to express himself. The Tinker
facts did not permit a similar approach because, as a practical
matter, if some parents had objected to their children's exposure to
the armbands, school officials could not have enforced the decisions
of those parents without frustrating the desires of other parents who
approved such exposure. In the instant case, however, asking parents to decide whether their children could complete the questionnaire would have placed no additional burden on defendants.
There are two advantages in asking parents to determine what
type of student expression is suitable for their children. First, by
deferring to parental judgment, courts in cases such as the instant
one would avoid the difficult determination of how far school authorities may restrict students' freedom of expression. When deference to parental judgment is practicable, courts would need to decide only the degree to which school authorities, conforming to the
judgment of students' parents, may control the intellectual intake
of students. Allowing school authorities to limit students' freedom
of expression to the extent that parents of other students object to
their children's exposure to the expression is a more defensible position than allowing a blanket prohibition of students' freedom of
speech based solely on abstract perceptions of what the average
parent would want for his child. Tinker clearly asserted that such
abstract fear cannot justify suppression of high school students'
rights to freedom of expression." Second, deference to parental
judgment would comport with the doctrine of less drastic means,58
which disfavors complete prohibition of speech when less restrictive
alternatives are available. If the instant court had required defendants to defer to parental discretion, some of the parents probably
would have allowed their children to participate in the survey, and
defendants would not have prohibited completely plaintiff's freedom of expression.
Admittedly, deference to parental discretion would not be prac55. See note 28 supra.
56. Traditional first amendment teaching requires that when "legitimate legislative [or
state] concerns are expressed in a statute [or a provision] which imposes a substantial
burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress [or the state] must achieve its
goal by means which have a 'less drastic' impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms." United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967). See also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). Commentators have criticized federal court decisions failing to
require the least restrictive means of regulating students' right to express themselves. See 45
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1278, 1283 (1970) (criticizing failure to use least restrictive alternative to
regulate students' expression in Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971)).

RECENT CASES

1978]

ticable in all cases involving freedom of speech claims in the high
school context. For example, school authorities could not perform
their duties if they had to obtain parental permission to expose
students to every arguably objectionable piece in a school newspaper and then enforce the decisions of each child's parents. Moreover,
parents do not have sufficient time to read every article in order to
make a proper decision about its content. In such situations school
authorities probably will continue to limit student expression according to their perception of parental desires, and courts must
apply the Tinker standard to such decisions to determine whether
school authorities have met their burden of proof. Courts should
require deference to parental judgment, however, when an analysis
of the facts of a case reveals that deference is practicable. Deference
to parental judgment would carve out a clear exception to the general body of cases involving freedom of expression claims in high
schools and would allow courts to uphold school authorities' regulation of arguably objectionable student expression according to the
desires of the parents in the community without having to erode the
Tinker standard.
ROBERT EDWARD BANTA

Corporations-Freeze-Out Mergers-The
Delaware Supreme Court Requires Majority
Shareholder Proof of a Valid Business Purpose As
a Component of Entire Fairness in Freeze-Out
Merger Challenges
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent declines in stock market averages' accompanied by
costly disclosure requirements imposed under the federal securities
laws2 have prompted many companies to reconsider their position's
as publicly held corporations. In response to the resulting minimal
1. Between January 1973 and December 1974 the Dow Jones Industrial Average

dropped over 400 points to 577.60, its lowest closing level since October 1962. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1974, at 39, col. 5. Although the Average has experienced recovery since 1974, reaching
a high of 1011.96 on March 24, 1976, it recently dropped below 770. See Wall St. J., Mar. 25,
1976, at 33, col. 1; Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1978, at 27, col. 4.
2. The cost of SEC registration and compliance can amount to $100,000 per year. See
Freeman, Going Private: CorporateInsiders Move to Eliminate Outside Shareholders, Wall
St. J., Oct. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 6; Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 907 (1974).
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benefits of public ownership, 3 many controlling shareholders now
seek to increase their control and participation in a corporation's
future profits by going private.' One means of going private is the
freeze-out merger, 5 by which a parent company forces the liquidation of minority interests in a publicly held subsidiary through a
merger of the subsidiary with the parent. By complying with applicable state merger statutes,6 the parent 7 may eliminate the minority's shares by tendering a cash-out price, which the minority either
must accept or have appraised judicially." The merger statutes thus
represent a legislative compromise between total majority control
and the single vote veto available to the minority at common law.,
Because the majority's elimination of the minority pursuant to
a merger statute arguably is oppressive,"0 the freeze-out merger has
fallen under increased judicial challenge by angered minority shareholders. The United States Supreme Court's refusal in Santa Fe
Industries,Inc. v. Green" to apply rule 10b-5'12 to freeze-out mergers
fully complying with state statutory disclosure requirements appar3. Although most companies find public listing beneficial because it provides a means
of advertisement and a source of future funding, these benefits often are outweighed by
burdensome SEC regulations requiring a corporation to send to its shareholders proxy statements and annual financial reports. See Note, supra note 2, at 904 n.7.
4. Going private is the designation given to a corporation's reacquisition of all its publicly held common stock, usually at depressed market prices. See, e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987 (1974); Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Note, supranote 2, at 903.
5. A merger under a state statute allowing subsequent elimination of minority shareholders is commonly referred to as a "freeze-out" or "take-out" merger. See Borden, supra
note 4, at 989, 994-97.
6. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101, 1110 (West 1977); DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253
(Michie 1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 901, 902, 905 (McKinney 1976).
7. A corporation can obtain the majority interest in another corporation necessary to
effect a statutory freeze-out merger in a number of ways. A parent company already might
hold a majority interest in its subsidiary, or a wholly unaffiliated company might acquire the
requisite majority interest by making a tender offer to purchase all the shares of an independent corporation and by subsequently purchasing the needed shares. Likewise, a company's
majority shareholders may form a nonoperating shell corporation, transfer all of their shares
to the shell, and force the merger of the company into the shell, thereby freezing out the
minority shareholders. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 4, at 987-89; Brudney, supra note 4, at
1019-20. See generally E. ARANow & H. EINHoRN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
(1973).
8. E.g., CAL.CORP. CODE § 1304 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie 1975);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 910 (McKinney 1976).
9. See Voellerv. Nielston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 (1941); Teschnerv. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill.
2d 452, 456, 322 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1974); Note, Eliminationof Minority
ShareInterest by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 629 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in CorporateResponsibility, [19741975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,694 (1974).
11. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
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ently foreclosed most opportunities for minority shareholders to assert a federal cause of action.' 3 Thus state corporate law remained
the primary remedy for dissatisfied minority shareholders. Because
state challenges prior to Green generally had upheld the validity of
freeze-out mergers, 4 no substantial federal or state law obstacles
seemed to prevent elimination of minority ownership.'5 Two recent
Delaware Supreme Court decisions, however, have articulated a
state law ground for challenging freeze-outs-the common law fiduciary duty imposed on majority shareholders for the benefit of the
minority. In Singer v. Magnavox Co., "1the Delaware court held that
the merger of a Delaware corporation for the sole purpose of freezing
out its minority shareholders violates this fiduciary duty. The court
ruled that in addition to complying with Delaware's merger statute,
a merger also must be grounded in a valid business purpose and
must meet a test of entire fairness to the minority. The court in
Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.'7 reaffirmed
Singer's requirement of entire fairness and found that a merger
transacted solely to benefit a parent company may be based on a
bona fide business purpose. Analysis of these decisions requires insight into the problems posed when the desire to prevent minority
oppression conflicts with Delaware's traditional judicial policy favoring majority stockholder control. "
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Delaware courts consistently have recognized a policy of judicial noninterference with a majority shareholder's corporate management policies." In Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling,2 the Delaware Supreme Court found that
a corporate shareholder's vote may be motivated by desire for personal profit so long as the shareholder violates no duty owed to
fellow shareholders. 21 Ringling thus implicitly relieved majority
13. But see Goldberg v. Meridor, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,162 (2d Cir.
Sept. 8, 1977) (holding that Green does not prohibit a 10b-5 action when all statutory merger
disclosure requirements are met, but the disclosures nevertheless are misleading or deceptive).
14. See notes 24-57 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Borden, supra note 4, at 997.
16. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
17. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
18.

See FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENRAnL CORPORAMON LAW, at xii (1973); Sommer, supra

note 10.
19.

See FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENRAL CORPORAION LAW, at xii (1973); Sommer, supra

note 10.
20. 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947).
21. Id. at 447.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:183

shareholders of any duty to the corporate entity, allowing them to
vote contrary to its best interests over objection of the minority. 2
The court subsequently held in Guth v. Loft, Inc.,rs however, that a
corporation's directors owe minority shareholders a fiduciary obligation of good faith and fairness. Subsequent extension of this fiduciary duty to majority shareholders2 4 conflicted with the traditional
judicial policy of noninterference with internal corporate management.
Delaware's judicial attempt to reconcile these conflicting doctrines in the context of freeze-out mergers has produced inconsistent
results. A line of cases beginning with Federal United Corp. v.
Havender2 5 took a promanagement stand in holding that judicial
appraisal constituted minority shareholders' sole remedy in freezeout merger challenges. In Havender defendant majority shareholders of a parent company sought to merge its subsidiary. To accomplish the merger, defendants recapitalized the parent by forcing its
minority shareholders to accept the conversion of old preferred stock
with accumulated dividends into common stock and new preferred
shares yielding a lower return.28 When the minority shareholders
sued to recover accumulated dividends, the Delaware court adhered
to its promanagement stand by holding the minority to the recapitalization terms imposed by the defendants and by approving the
merger. 21 Similarly, in Stauffer v. StandardBrands, Inc., 21 in which
plaintiff objected to a freeze-out merger by alleging oppressive treatment by the majority, the Delaware Supreme Court found that
plaintiff's challenge reflected only disagreement with the monetary
value of his shares and that the statutory right to appraisal provided
22. For support, the court in Ringling cited Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17 Del.
Ch. 214, 151 A. 303 (1930) (stockholders may exercise wide liberality of judgment when
voting), and Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923)

(court will not inquire into personal motives prompting a stockholder's vote in favor of the
sale of corporate assets).
23. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
24. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
25. 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
26. As part of the recapitalization, defendants offered plaintiffs the option of receiving

for each share of $6 preferred stock with accumulated dividends one share of new $3 preferred
stock and six shares of class A common stock or cash liquidation. Id. at 323-24, 11 A.2d at
334.

27. Id. at 325-26, 11 A.2d at 334-35. See also MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51
F. Supp. 462, 466 (D. Del. 1943) (adopting a "presumption of bona fides of business purpose"

and noting that "reasons for the merger . . . are not matters for judicial determination")
(citing Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923)).
28. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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his only remedy. 2' When a chancery court faced allegations of a
majority shareholder's self dealing intended to eliminate the minority in David J Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries,Inc.,3 o the court
agreed with the Stauffer opinion that the sole issue concerned valuation of the minority's shares, which could be resolved only by resort
to the statutory right of appraisal.3 1 In so concluding, the court
expressly approved Stauffer and emphasized Delaware's judicial
policy against impeding the consummation of an orderly merger
under the state's statutes. 32 Therefore, according to the line of cases
from Havender through Schenley Industries, the statutory right of
appraisal appeared to offer the exclusive remedy for dissatisfied
33
minority shareholders contesting a freeze-out merger.
A separate line of cases offered greater protection to minority
shareholders contesting the oppressiveness of freeze-out mergers.
This marked change in Delaware judicial attitude began with the
decision of Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,34 in which minority
shareholders attempted to enjoin Mayflower's merger with its parent. Emphasizing the majority's fiduciary role, the court held that
the majority shareholders' involvement on both sides of the transaction35 placed on them the burden of establishing the merger's entire
fairness and subjected the merger to careful judicial scrutiny. In
determining the merger's entire fairness, however, the court scrutinized only the fairness of the price paid for minority shares, 3
thereby creating uncertainty whether the entire fairness test extended to examination of factors other than the freeze-out price.37
Relying on Sterling, a chancery court in David J. Greene & Co. v.
29. Id. at 11, 187 A.2d at 80.
30. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
31. Id. at 33.
32. Id. at 36.
33. In regard to the exclusiveness of the appraisal remedy, see Vorenberg, Exclusiveness
of the DissentingStockholders Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. Rzv. 1189 (1964).
34. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
35. In freeze-out mergers, the majority shareholder of the subsidiary usually is the
majority shareholder or owner of the parent. Consequently, his motives in freezing out the
minority shareholders of the subsidiary are suspect because of an inherent possibility of selfdealing. Thus the court in Sterling shifted the burden of proof to the majority to establish
the merger's fairness in such cases. Id. at 298-99, 93 A.2d at 109-10.
36. After Sterling, a Delaware chancery court in Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34
Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953), stated that "action by majority stockholders having as its
purpose the 'freezing-out' of a minority interest is actionable without regard to the fairness
of price." Id. at 12, 99 A.2d at 239. Defendants in Bennett were not seeking to force a merger,
however, but were attempting to cancel stock under a plan adopted by the requisite statutory
vote, which plaintiffs alleged was oppressive and imposed for unfair consideration.
37. See Borden, supra note 4, at 997.
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Dunhill International,Inc.3" enjoined the merger of a parent and its
subsidiary, finding that the parent had not met its burden under
Sterling of proving the transaction's fairness." Although the decision in Dunhill Internationalwas based in part on inadequate
merger terms,4" the court also found that the majority stockholders'
diversion to the parent of a business opportunity available to the
minority" breached the majority's fiduciary obligation. 42 In an unpublished subsequent opinion, a chancery court in Pennsylvania
Mutual Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter International,Inc.43 enjoined a
proposed freeze-out merger. The court held that when the majority
has no valid business purpose for the merger, the appraisal remedy
is not exclusive. Thus Dunhill and Todhunter evidenced attempts
by the Delaware judiciary to extend Sterling's entire fairness test to
scrutinize the majority's fiduciary obligations. Lower courts rendered both these decisions, however, and at least one commentator
argued that the Delaware Supreme Court would not adopt their
logic.14

Other jurisdictions experienced similar difficulties in compromising the conflicting policies inherent in merger challenges. In

Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 45 defendants attempted to cash out

the plaintiff, a retired director and minority shareholder, allegedly
to restrict stockholders to active employees only.4" When plaintiff
38. 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
39. Id. at 436.
40. Plaintiffs in Dunhill contested the proposed merger's fairness, contending inter alia
that the proposed exchange of 1.6 shares of parent common for each share of subsidiary stock
was grossly unfair and inequitable. The court held that because the minority shareholders
would experience substantial dilution in earnings and book value, they sustained the burden
of proving the probability of their success at trial, thereby establishing a right to temporary
injunction. Id.
41. Plaintiffs alleged that the parent company diverted to itself the opportunity to
acquire Child Guidance Toys, Inc., which the subsidiary was able financially to undertake.
The court sustained this contention, finding the diversion to be a breach of the majority's
fiduciary duty under Guth v. Loft, Inc. Id. at 434-35.
42. Despite Dunhill's intimation that equity will enjoin an unfair merger regardless of
the fairness of price, the later case of Schenley Industries,see notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text, nevertheless suggests that the appraisal remedy should be exclusive. See Brudney,
supra note 4, at 1029 n.40.
43. No. 4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975). For a discussion of Todhunter, see Arsht, Minority
Stockholder Freezeouts Under DelawareLaw, 32 Bus. LAw. 1495 (1977).
44. Prior to the instant opinions, one commentator argued that Delaware courts would
not expand on the Todhunter logic but would limit the case to its particular facts, thus
reemphasizing confidence in the fairness to minority shareholders guaranteed by the appraisal remedy. See Arsht, supra note 43, at 1496. In any event, the dispute involved in
Todhunter was settled prior to appeal, thus leaving the issue undecided by Delaware's highest
court. Id. at 1495.
45. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. Defendants alleged a long-standing corporate policy of allowing only active employ-
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refused to sell, defendants caused the merger of defendant corporation into a recently formed nonoperating parent47 and attempted to
force a statutory 8 freeze-out merger. The Fifth Circuit, applying
Georgia law under pendent jurisdiction,49 enjoined the transaction.
The court held that a merger with a nonoperating parent formed for
no other business purpose than to effect a freeze-out constituted a
breach of defendants' fiduciary duty. 0 A New Jersey court faced
with a challenge similar to Bryan in Berkowitz v. Power/Mate
Corp.51found the Bryan approach tempting to follow, but analyzed
only the adequacy of the freeze-out price, refusing to scrutinize the
allegedly improper business purpose.52 In Jutkowitz v. Bourns,
Inc., 0 however, a California superior court fully scrutinized an allegedly improper business motive, holding that minority shareholders
have a right to continued participation in the subsidiary and may
not be eliminated without a legitimate business reason. 4
ees to remain as shareholders of the company. Id. at 565.
47. Active shareholders of Brock & Blevins formed a new corporation, Power Erectors,
Inc., and transferred their Brock & Blevins stock to the new corporation. Power Erectors'
resulting 85% majority interest in Brock & Blevins was adequate under the merger statute to
force the cash-out of plaintiff. Id. at 567.
48. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1001 to 1202 (Harrison 1977).
49. Jurisdiction in the United States district court was obtained by allegation of specific
violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and
rule 10b-5 of the Securities & Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). Pendent
jurisdiction attached to the state claim. 490 F.2d at 564-65.
50. The Bryan court reached this conclusion without citing any supporting state decision. See Note, supra note 2, at 921. The court relied on fiduciary principles discussed in
Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), and Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939), to support its conclusion that a majority shareholder's use of a merger statute for no
valid business purpose other than elimination of minority shareholders violates general principles of equity and corporate law. A Fifth Circuit district court subsequently followed Bryan
but found a clear business purpose underlying the challenged freeze-out merger. Grimes v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812
(5th Cir. 1975). A Utah district court in a memorandum decision also adopted Bryan's
business purpose analysis. Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974).
51. 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
52. Although plaintiffs in Berkowitz alleged an improper business purpose, the court
found that "[ilt
may well be that the public stockholders of Power/Mate would benefit from
the purchase of their stock. If so, the question at issue is whether the price they are being
offered ... is a fair and reasonable one." Id. at 49, 342 A.2d at 574. See also Note, The
Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private, 64 CAIF. L. REv. 1184,
1202 (1976).
53. No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Nov. 19, 1975).
54. The California court based its conclusion on Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.
3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969), finding that the appraisal guarantee of fair
market value did not protect adequately the minority's right of participation. Jutkowitz v.
Bourns, Inc., No. CA 000268, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Nov. 19, 1975). See
also Note, supra note 52, at 1203-04. By approving a minority's right of participation based
on a possible "sentimental attachment" to stock, the California court has taken a position
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The opinions in Bryan and Jutkowitz thus evidenced a trend
toward increased minority shareholder protection in freeze-out
merger challenges 5 Despite the reluctance of Delaware courts"' to
look beyond the price fairness of a freeze-out merger, the broad
Sterling mandate of entire fairness clearly could be extended to
encompass analysis of a merger's underlying business purpose.57 The
availability and the scope of nonstatutory remedies to minority
shareholders in freeze-out mergers nevertheless remained uncertain
in Delaware prior to the instant decisions.
I.

THE INSTANT OPINIONS

In Singer v. Magnavox Co., plaintiffs sought an order" nullifying the merger 5 of Magnavox into T.M.C. Development Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of North American Philips Corporation.60 Plaintiffs, minority shareholders in Magnavox, contended
that the merger served no valid business purpose other than the
forced removal of minority shareholders and that in approving the
merger at a grossly inadequate price, defendants breached their
fiduciary duty. Defendants asserted their full compliance with the
long abandoned by most jurisdictions after the adoption of merger statutes. See Borden,
supra note 4, at 1000-01.
55. In Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Fla.
1974), afl'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), however, it was argued that Bryan is limited to those
transactions involving the merger of a close subsidiary with a nonoperating parent. Likewise,
Jutkowitz involved a merger with a nonoperating shell parent and similarly may be distinguished. See Note, supra note 52, at 1203.
56. Professor Folk, in his commentary on the Delaware general corporate law, notes that
over two-thirds of all corporations whose securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated under the laws of Delaware. Thus, he states, "viewed realistically,
Delaware corporation law is national corporation law." FOLK, supra note 18, at xii.
57. For an argument that Delaware would not and should not adopt a business purpose
analysis in freeze-out merger challenges, see Arsht, supra note 43.
58. Plaintiffs also sought compensatory damages. 380 A.2d at 972.
59. The merger was transacted as a "long form" merger pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 251 (Michie 1975). Section 251 authorizes the merger of two or more Delaware
corporations upon approval by the directors of each corporation and upon majority vote of
the outstanding stock of each corporation followed by filing of the appropriate documents
with the county in which each constituent corporation is located. For a discussion of § 251,
see FOLK, supra note 18, at 315-45.
60. The merger in dispute was transacted in two steps. North American Philips Corporation, originally wholly unaffiliated with Magnavox, formed North American Philips Development Corporation for the purpose of making the original tender offer for the purchase of
Magnavox shares. Once a majority interest was secured, Magnavox formed T.M.C. Development Corporation to act as the parent in the transaction. The merger subsequently was
accomplished under § 251. See note 59 supra.
61. Plaintiffs also contended that the merger violated the antifraud provision of the
Delaware Securities Act. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (Michie 1975). The court rejected this
contention, finding that plaintiffs, residents of Pennsylvania, did not establish sufficient
contact with Delaware to invoke the statute. 380 A.2d at 981.
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2
Delaware merger statute and contended that statutory appraisal
furnished the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The court first established that the majority shareholders owe a high standard of fiduciary fairness to minority shareholders, which is not satisfied necessarily by full compliance with the applicable merger statutes 3 and4
by relegation of the minority to an exclusive appraisal remedy.
Despite case law 5 indicating that minority shareholders purchase
with notice of the majority's statutory merger right, the court stated
that Delaware courts will not be indifferent to the purpose of a
merger when a freeze-out of minority shareholders is alleged as its
sole purpose."6 The court thus held that the majority must prove a
valid business purpose for the merger in order to satisfy Delaware's
high fiduciary standards. In addition, the court stated that proof of
a valid business purpose will not necessarily discharge fiduciary
obligations. Lower courts still must scrutinize all aspects of the
merger for compliance with Sterling's mandate of entire fairness. 7
A concurring opinion emphasized that future cases should scrutinize a merger's economic reasonableness based on all relevant
facts."

62. Pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie 1975), the stockholders of any
merged corporation who opposed the merger agreement may demand judicial determination
of the value of their stock by a court appointed appraiser. For a discussion of § 262, see FOLK,
supra note 18, at 369-97.
63. Despite statutory authorization for the merger and defendants' compliance with the
statute's terms, the court held that the merger nevertheless was assailable because
"inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible." 380
A.2d at 975 (citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)).
64. Defendants conceded that they owed plaintiffs a fiduciary duty but contended that
in the context of the present merger, they had met their duty by offering fair value for the
Magnavox shares. The court found, however, that the fiduciary duty defined by Guth v. Loft,
Inc., see text accompanying note 23 supra, entitles minority shareholders to enjoin a merger
for proper cause and forbids majority stockholders from causing a merger for the sole purpose
of eliminating the minority. 380 A.2d at 977-78.
65. The court cited Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331
(Sup. Ct. 1940). See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
66. In so concluding, the instant court distinguished Havender, Stauffer, and Schenley
Industries as factually noncontrolling. See notes 24-33 supra and accompanying text. Since
Stauffer concluded that the complaint alleged only a difference of opinion as to cash-out
value, the instant court decided that Stauffer did not approve a merger transacted solely to
eliminate the minority. 380 A.2d at 978-79. Furthermore, the court expressly stated that any
statement in Stauffer inconsistent with its opinion is inapplicable to a § 251 merger. Id. at
980. But see Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
67. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
68. According to the concurring opinion, Sterling established an avenue for judicial
scrutiny of "the business purpose, or economic necessity, desirability and feasibility involved,
evidence of self-serving, manipulation, or overreaching, and all other relevant factors of
intrinsic fairness or unfairness." 380 A.2d 982. The concurrence also emphasized the continu-
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Less than a month later, the court decided Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., an appeal by minority shareholders
from denial of an order to restrain temporarily a proposed merger
of the Kliklok Corporation into International General Industries
(IGI). Plaintiffs, minority owners of Kliklok, contended that Kliklok's majority shareholders 9 breached their fiduciary duty because
their sole purpose was to benefit IGI, the parent corporation. Defendants asserted that their intent to benefit the parent established a
valid business purpose ° and that the cash-out price was intrinsically fair. Although recognizing that Singer established a minority
shareholder's right not to be eliminated for an improper business
purpose, the court first stated that it must analyze the majority's
rights as voting stockholders of the subsidiary in relation to the
competing rights of the subsidiary's minority shareholders., The
court concluded that since under Ringling, the majority shareholders are entitled to vote in their best interests7 2 and need not sacrifice
these interests in dealing with the minority, their intent to benefit
the parent satisfies Singer's requirement of a bona fide business
purpose. As in Singer, the court stated that establishment of a bona
fide business purpose necessarily does not discharge fiduciary obligations because
the majority also must prove the merger's entire
3
fairness.
IV.

COMMENT

The court's adoption of a business purpose requirement as a
component of the entire fairness test marks a shift from the Delaware judiciary's reliance on exclusiveness of the appraisal remedy
as protection for minority shareholder interests to the imposition on
ing legislative approval of mergers and the judicially mandated avoidance of their disruption

by the dissenting minority. Id.
69. Defendants, International General Industries, Inc., and its directors owned an 81%
interest in the Kliklok Corporation. To transact the merger, defendants formed the KLK
Corporation and approved the merger of KLK into Kliklok. 379 A.2d at 1122.
70. Defendants contended and the lower court found that the principal reason for the
merger was to facilitate long-term debt financing by IGI, the parent company. Id. at 1124.
71. The court stated that since "it is the power and right of IGI as a stockholder of
Kliklok which is really under review . . . IGI is entitled to have its rights in dealing selfinterestedly with Kliklok measured by reference to its status as stockholder." Id. at 1123.

72.

According to the court, this conclusion is supported by general corporate law de-

tailed in W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2031 (Penn. ed.
1970).
73. Because the chancery court had concluded that IGI's need to facilitate long-term
debt financing established a legitimate, present, and compelling business reason to merge,
the court remanded the case only for determination of the merger's entire fairness. 379 A.2d
at 1125.
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majority shareholders of a higher fiduciary standard. Prior to the
instant decisions, exclusiveness of the statutory appraisal remedy 4
provided majority shareholders certainty that a merger would be
completed by leaving only the cash-out price subject to judicial
scrutiny. Moreover, the entire legislative merger scheme provided
minority shareholders with constructive knowledge of the majority's

right to effect a freeze-out merger.75 Thus prior to Singer minority

shareholders arguably purchased a subsidiary's stock subject to a
potential cash-out merger as an implied contractual agreement.
Further, legislative enactment of a statutory appraisal remedy arguably provided a legislative exception to high common law fiduciary
standards. Finally, exclusive judicial application of the appraisal
remedy served to further Delaware's policy of promoting orderly
consummation of statutory mergers while protecting minority stockholders from potential majority overreaching.78
Although Singer purports to base its business purpose requirement on Delaware's continuing high fiduciary standard, 77 prior Delaware merger decisions do not support fully the high standard's
existence. 7 Tanzer's withdrawal from Singer's emphasis on the majority's fiduciary duty by approving Ringling's tolerance of selfinterested stockholder voting further questions the existence of this
paramount duty.7 ' By clearly holding that intent to benefit the par-

ent satisfies Singer's business purpose requirement, Tanzer expressly endorses a majority shareholder's self-dealing if any business
motive other than a sole desire to eliminate the minority exists.
Such self-interested voting, which results in the elimination of minority stockholders, cannot satisfy high standards of fiduciary fairness. Thus, although Tanzer approves Singer's requirement of a
valid business purpose as a component of entire fairness, it undermines the strength of the requirement by permitting proof of intent
to benefit the parent to satisfy the business motive test.
Singer's intentional refusal to define whose business purpose"
74.
75.

See notes 25-33 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.

76. Several commentators have argued that appraisal remedies should not foreclose
other lines of attack on proposed mergers. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 33. Nevertheless,

several state appraisal statutes expressly are exclusive, and case law has interpreted many
others to be exclusive. See Borden, supra note 4, at 1023-28.
77. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
78. For an extreme example of the Delaware judiciary's refusal to recognize high fiduciary standards owing by majority to minority shareholders, see Stauffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
79. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.

80. According to the Singer court, if the majority asserts intent to benefit the subsidiary, the result is academic to the minority who no longer holds any subsidiary interest.
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satisfies fiduciary obligations leaves the scope of the business purpose test unclear and subject to the kind of judicial undermining
illustrated by Tanzer. If Singer had demanded majority shareholder
proof of a compelling need to merge,"1 proof of benefit to the subsidiary would appear to be required since the majority owes a fiduciary
duty only as stockholders of the subsidiary. The more demanding
compelling need test would provide greater certainty for majority
shareholders of merging parents questioning whether a particular
business purpose will satisfy Singer's requirements. Tanzer's less
stringent business purpose requirement, however, is satisfied more
easily by majority shareholders, who must show only incidental economic benefit to the parent to overcome any allegation of intent to
eliminate the minority. Since the parent is unlikely to merge its
subsidiary without incurring some incidental economic benefit, it
easily may disguise any true intent to eliminate the minority.
Although both Singer and Tanzer require the majority to go
beyond establishment of a valid business purpose to satisfy entire
fairness, neither case defines the relevance of a bona fide business
purpose to the determination of entire fairness nor the steps that
must be taken by the majority to prove entire fairness to minority
shareholders in a freeze-out merger. The entire fairness test requires
formulation of an equitable remedy that demands subjective lower
court evaluation of policies underlying the multitude of merger
forms, 82 and thus may result in inconsistent resolution of factually
similar mergers. For example, lower courts must consider whether
the parent is public or private,s whether the subsidiary has been
consistently held or recently acquired, 4 whether the parent is a
nonoperating shell corporation,"' and whether the parent or subsidiary is a closely held corporation. Adjudication thus will depend on
Conversely, the court stated, intent to benefit the parent raises issues that the minority has
difficulty contesting. Thus, although denying that exploration of the business purpose is
without merit, the court chose to analyze competing majority and minority interests rather
than scrutinizing the alleged business purpose. 380 A.2d at 976.
81. The adoption of a "compelling need to merge" standard is suggested in Note, supra
note 2, at 922-24.

82. One commentator consistently has urged that neither a valid business purpose nor
an entire fairness test can consider fairly all the various policy considerations underlying
factually different mergers. See Borden, supra note 4, at 1022-23; Borden, Delaware Speaks
Out Again on Takeouts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 2; Borden, Some Comments on

Singer v. Magnavox, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Borden,
See Borden,
See Borden,
See Borden,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

4,
4,
4,
4,

at
at
at
at

1018-19; Note, supra note 52, at 1212-13.
1018-19; Note, supra note 52, at 1212-13.
1019; Note, supra note 52, at 1213-16.
1019-20.
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the emphasis accorded each consideration by various judges and
inevitably will result in inconsistencies not present under an exclusive appraisal remedy. Furthermore, adoption of an undefined entire fairness test will serve to deter parent corporations from transacting freeze-out mergers because of fear of judicial injunctions that
minority shareholders will utilize to demand unrealistic cash-out
prices."7
The instant decisions' requirement of a bona fide business purpose as a component of an undefined entire fairness test eliminates
the certainty provided by Delaware's statutory merger scheme.88
This uncertainty resulting from inevitable inconsistency in application of a vague fairness test emphasizes the need for a legislative
remedy that will provide increased minority shareholder protection
while retaining the certainty afforded majority shareholders by exclusive application of the appraisal remedy. If Delaware desires to
increase minority stockholder protection while maintaining its policy of promoting statutory mergers, legislative amendment of the
appraisal remedy offers the only satisfactory solution to these con87. Various courts have expressed some reluctance to enjoin freeze-out mergers when
it appears that minority shareholders are seeking only bargaining leverage to demand a higher
cash-out price. Thus the California court in Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc. sought to shape an
alternative remedy to prevent this form of inequity. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
See also Note, supra note 52, at 1203-04.
88. Professor Folk argues that "these two decisions, within a defined ambit, yield a
greater measure of certainty and predictability than existed before." Folk, Holding by State
Court Grounded in PriorLaw, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 29, col. 5. He bases his contention
on the conclusion that prior to the instant decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court had
promulgated the entire fairness test in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., see notes 34-37
supra and accompanying text, but subsequently had adopted a procedural device requiring
minority shareholder proof of actionable majority shareholder self-dealing, which allowed the
courts to dispose of most cases without applying the entire fairness test. E.g., Chasin v. Gluck,
282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1971). According to Professor Folk, this procedural device, which he
labels a doctrinal deviation from Sterling's entire fairness mandate, created uncertainty in
planning freeze-out mergers because no parent corporation could be sure that the Delaware
judiciary would not reverse its position and scrutinize the conflict of interest merger without
requiring preliminary proof of actionable self-dealing. Indeed, Tanzerbears out Folk's contention by remanding the case for lower court determination of the proposed merger's entire
fairness even though no actionable self-dealing was established.
Promanagement cases such as Stauffer v. StandardBrands, Inc. and DavidJ. Greene &
Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., see text accompanying notes 28-33 supra, however, established at the very least a judicial attitude of promoting statutory mergers when no evidence
of fraud or blatant overreaching exists. This judicial attitude, in turn, made parent corporations confident that most statutory mergers would receive judicial approval if the parent
tendered a fair price for minority shares. Moreover, Delaware's statutory merger scheme
requires no proof of entire fairness but does provide an appraisal remedy for resolution of
minority shareholder claims. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie 1975). If this appraisal
remedy had been adjudged the exclusive remedy for minority shareholder challenges to proposed freeze-out mergers, greater certainty clearly would have been provided to parent corporations that now must plan a merger's entire fairness without judicial guidance.
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flicting policies.8 9 The amendment should provide that the merging
parent must offer a stock conversion of the parent for subsidiary
shares or alternatively, a minority share in the parent's expected
post-merger profits." The amendment essentially would expand the
appraisal remedy by requiring the judiciary to derive an estimate
of the parent's potential post-merger profit and to distribute this
additional amount to the minority on a per share basis. If the parent
expects a loss, it still should be required to pay fair value for minority shares, thus deterring the merger to the extent that it is uneconomical for the parent to absorb the whole loss. Amending the appraisal remedy thus will protect the minority from loss of potential
future profits while affording majority shareholders certainty that
the merger will be upheld if the minority challenges its fairness.
Until statutory relief is forthcoming, Delaware courts must grope for
consistent adjudication of freeze-out merger challenges guided only
by the undefined tests of valid business purpose and entire fairness.
OBY

T.

BREWER III

Criminal Procedure-Prosecutorial ImmunityFederal Prosecutor Is Not Absolutely Immune
From Suit for Alleged Perjury
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs' brought a civil action in tort 2 charging that defendant federal prosecutor's 3 alleged perjury at a hearing incident to a
89. Cf. Borden, Delaware Speaks Out Again on Takeouts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at
1, col. 2 (arguing that judicial relief in freeze-out merger challenges is wholly inadequate and
that only adoption of a legislative remedy can provide adequate and certain relief).
90. Various commentators have suggested the distribution of post-merger profits as an
equitable solution to an unfair cash-out price. See Brudney, supranote 4, at 1025; Note, supra
note 52 at 1216-20. Although this solution may prove difficult to apply when expected future
profits are uncertain, its adjudication should prove no more difficult than an appraisal of a
prospering corporation's share value in a depressed market.

1. Plaintiffs were members of an antiwar activist group known as the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization (VVAW/WSO).
2. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief, damages, and the appointment of a special prosecutor to explore

the alleged official wrongdoing. The instant court did not determine whether the Bivens
action extended to cases of this type; it assumed the extension for the purposes of its discussion, leaving the determination to be made at the district court level. See note 48 infra and
accompanying text.
3. In 1972 Goodwin, an attorney in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division,
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grand jury investigation of plaintiffs' activities' violated their constitutional rights. On motion to dismiss, defendant contended that
he enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity because he had been
acting at the hearing in his official capacity as a special federal
prosecutor. The district court' denied the motion, holding that the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity does not apply when the prosecutor is alleged to have committed perjury.7 On interlocutory appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, held, affirmed. Because a federal prosecutor's perjury during a court hearing incident and prior to a grand jury investigation
falls within his investigative duty rather than his advocatory duty,
the prosecutor is entitled only to a qualified immunity.' Briggs v.
Goodwin, No. 75-1642 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 1977).
was appointed to serve as a Special Attorney for the investigation into the activities of the
VVAW/WSO and to "assist in the trial of the case or cases" growing out of the investigation.
4. On the day of Goodwin's appointment subpoenas were served on more than twenty
members of the organization scattered over four states and the District of Columbia. All were
ordered to appear before a grand jury in Tallahassee, Florida. Many of the individuals had
not met before and there were rumors that informants were among those who appeared with
their attorneys. Prior to the commencement of the grand jury hearing, counsel filed a motion
asking the district court to direct Goodwin and his associates to disclose whether any agents
or informers were among those subpoenaed. During a hearing on the motion the district court
peremptorily ordered Goodwin to take the witness stand and be sworn. The court then asked
Goodwin whether "any of [the] witnesses represented by counsel [were] agents or informants" of the United States. Goodwin said, "No, Your Honor." The court denied counsel's
request for an opportunity to question Goodwin.
The grand jury eventually indicted six of the plaintiffs, charging them with a variety of
crimes centering around an alleged conspiracy unlawfully to disrupt the 1972 Republican
National Convention. During discovery prior to the criminal trial the plaintiffs received
materials which revealed that one Emerson Poe had been functioning as an FBI informant
for some period of time. They alleged that prior to the grand jury proceeding Poe had relayed
to federal investigators the substance of his conversations with one plaintiff, and that Poe
served as an ongoing source of information concerning the defense strategy even after the
indictments were returned. The plaintiffs were acquitted of all criminal charges.
5. In addition to Goodwin, the complaint named as defendants two regular federal
prosecutors from the Northern District of Florida and a special agent of the FBI. The complaint was dismissed as to the latter three defendants for lack of venue and jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed and reinstated the complaint as to all defendants.
6. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
7. The defendant Goodwin subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that he had
absolute witness immunity from any damage action or civil suit based on his alleged false
testimony. The district court also denied this motion, but certified only the question of
prosecutorial immunity for interlocutory appeal.
8. It is important to note the procedural differences between an absolute immunity and
a qualified immunity. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at its outset as long as the act
complained of was committed while acting within the scope of the immunity. Whether an
official is protected under a qualified immunity is dependent upon the circumstances and
motivations of his actions, and if the claim is properly pleaded this often can be determined
only after all the relevant evidence is introduced at trial. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974).
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The common law principle that governmental officers should
not be held liable for harm caused by their official conduct is rooted
in the premise that public officials who exercise discretion will be
unreasonably deterred from independent and vigorous decision
making if they fear later review of their judgments through vindictive civil litigation.' Although the absolute immunity of judges has
long been recognized,10 the development of an immunity rule for
prosecuting attorneys has been complicated by the diversity of prosecutorial functions. Some activities, such as decisions to prosecute
and to present particular evidence to a jury, are closely associated
with the judicial process and cast the prosecutor in the role of an
officer of the court. Others, such as the direction of investigations
or participation in surveillance activities, are further removed from
the judicial function and cast the prosecutor in the role of an administrative or investigative officer.
At common law a prosecutor was immune from suit for malicious prosecution" and for defamatory remarks made in the exercise
of his discretion during the course of judicial proceedings.' The
prosecutor's immunity, however, was not absolute.' 3 In a malicious
prosecution action arising from criminal proceedings in which a
prosecutor did not obtain an indictment, the privilege could be
overcome by a showing of malice or lack of probable cause." Additionally, a prosecutor was not absolutely immune from suit for false
arrest,'" and presumably, his immunity did not encompass assault."
9. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. Ray. 263, 271-72 (1937) (listing nine identifiable reasons for the rule:
(1) saving judges' time; (2) preventing influence on decisions through fear of subsequent suits;
(3) removing discouragement to judicial office; (4) separation of powers; (5) necessity of
finality of decisions; (6) existence of avenues of redress for erroneous decisions; (7) unfairness
in penalizing honest error; (8) direction of judges' duty to public rather than individuals; and
(9) judicial self-protection).
10. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1871).
At common law a judge was not liable for any injury resulting from acts performed within
his jurisdiction, and jurisdiction was construed so broadly that a judge was held liable only
if he acted entirely without color of authority. The common law immunity of judges was fully
preserved in suits alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 553-55. See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
11. See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), af'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927);
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.3, at 305 n.7 (1956).
12. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d at 402-03; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 586 &
comment b (1977); 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 11, §§ 5.21-.22, at 419-27.
13. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 989 (4th ed. 1971).
14. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 P. 879 (1908); Leong Yau v. Carden,
23 Hawaii 362 (1916).
15. Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182 (1916); 1 HARPER& JAMES, supra
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Prosecutorial liability at common law thus varied greatly with the
nature of the prosecutor's activity.17
Federal courts traditionally held that prosecutors at the federal
level enjoy absolute immunity under the common law for their judicial functions. 8 The courts also held that section 198319 did not
modify a state prosecutor's quasi-judicial immunity and continued
to utilize common law principles to define prosecutorial immunity. 0
Many of the federal courts nevertheless recognized that the scope
of prosecutorial immunity could not be determined solely by reference to the prosecutor's official status but must be ascertained by
examining the nature of his conduct.21 Courts thus granted absolute
immunity from section 1983 actions to a prosecutor's "judicial"
acts, including the filing of complaints, the institution of proceedings for search or arrest of a suspect, and the drawing of indictments
and informations. 2 When a prosecutor engaged in investigative,
police-like roles, however, he often was granted only a qualified
note 11, §§ 3.17-.18.
16. McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8
Rrr.-CAM. L.J. 65, 92 (1976).

17. Id.
18. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), originally passed as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
The advent of the 1871 Civil Rights Act and § 1983 actions caused a re-examination of
the doctrine of common law immunity with respect to all officials. Section 1983 provided
remedies for violations of federally-protected rights by persons acting under color of state law.
Although its narrow language clearly seemed to abrogate all immunities in t6rt actions,
arguments that it should be strictly interpreted did not prevail. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 417 n.11 (1976). In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Supreme Court
established that § 1983 was to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunity
rather than in derogation of them.
20. E.g., Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581
(3d Cir. 1966); Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963). A prosecutor acting within
the scope of his prosecutorial duties was immune from § 1983 damage suits, since be was
shielded by the same immunity protecting a judge acting within his jurisdiction. E.g., Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965). A prosecutor acting outside the scope of
his jurisdiction was not absolutely immune from suit. E.g., Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99
(5th Cir. 1969); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 591 (3d Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227
F.2d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 1955); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
21. E.g., Corsican Prods. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cir. 1964); Balistrieri v.
Warren, 314 F. Supp. 824, 826 (W.D. Wis. 1970); see Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 450
(7th Cir. 1975).
22. McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 16, at 92.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:196

entitled him to the good faith defense shielding
immunity, which
23
officers.
police
Because a prosecutor is an executive officer, he also may be
entitled to immunities granted members of the executive branch. In
early common law challenges to executive actions, the Supreme
Court held that high federal officers are absolutely immune from
civil liability for actions taken within the scope of their authority.24
The Court also granted immunity to lower administrative officials
and police officers for "discretionary" acts, requiring personal deliberation and judgment and carried out in good faith.,
Although section 1983 did not abolish the common law good
faith defense, the Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes21 departed
from common law guidelines to decide the issue of state executive
immunity under section 1983. In Scheuer personal representatives
of three students killed by the Ohio National Guard at Kent State
University sued the Governor of Ohio and other state officials for
damages under section 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had
unnecessarily deployed the Ohio National Guard on the Kent State
campus and had ordered the Guardsmen to perform illegal actions
that ultimately caused the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents. By refusing to extend absolute immunity to even the highest state executive
official, 27 a unanimous Supreme Court narrowed the scope of execu23. See Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 91, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Guerro v. Mulhearn,
498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1029 (1972); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965). The rationale
most often employed is that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity only by reason of the
integral relationship between his acts and the judicial process. If the immunity is derivative
from that of judges then it is absolute except for acts taken wholly in the absence of jurisdiction. If it is deemed to rest on the prosecutor's role, however, then the reason for the immunity
ceases to exist when he acts in other than a quasi-judicial capacity. McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 16, at 91.
24. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General); Kendall v.
Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 86 (1845) (Cabinet officials); Cooper v. O'Connor, 107 F.2d 207 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 615 (1939) (Comptroller of the Currency).
25. Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 179 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1950) (policeman). See
generally PROSSER, supra note 13, § 132, at 989; HARPER & JAmEs, supra note 11, § 3.18, at
227-28. The distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions is often difficult to
ascertain; the decisional technique relies more on labeling than analysis. Recent Supreme
Court decisions have generally avoided the "ministerial-discretionary" language in favor of
analysis focusing on the nature of the official function. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 132, at 989.
26. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
27. The Court stated:
[1]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch
of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time
of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable
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tive immunity under section 1983.28 At common law good faith alone
generally had been sufficient to establish qualified immunity.29 To
obtain immunity under section 1983, however, Scheuer required an
executive official to prove three elements: (1) that he acted in good
faith; (2) that he had reasonable grounds to believe that his conduct
was valid; and (3) that his actions fell within the scope of his official
duties. 3 The Court failed to explain clearly whether an executive's
qualified good faith immunity was a defense or an element of the
3
cause of action. '
The scope of the immunity doctrine announced in Scheuer was
refined in Wood v. Strickland.2 In Wood two high school students,
expelled from school without a hearing for violating a school regulation, 33 sought damages under section 1983 against school board
members, claiming denial of their right to due process. The district
court, relying on common law principles, granted the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict on the ground that school board members were immune from suit absent proof of malice. The Supreme
Court, however, refused to adopt the absolute common law immunity and held that Scheuer's good faith standard requires an objective
as well as a subjective analysis of the challenged conduct. 34 The
appropriate standard thus asks whether the official knew or should
have known that his actions would deprive those accused of misconduct of their constitutional rights and whether the official acted
with malicious intent to cause such a deprivation. 3, Viewed together
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers
for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Id. at 247-48.
28. McCormack & Kirkpatrick, supra note 16, at 84. See generally Kattan, Knocking
on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage
Actions, 30 VAND. L. REv. 941, 974 (1977).
29. See, e.g., Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-07 (1st Cir. 1953).
30. 416 U.S. at 247-48. Some lower courts, however, have overlooked the "reasonable
grounds" criterion, citing Scheuer as establishing merely a good faith defense. Laverne v.
Coming, 522 F.2d 1144,1148 (2d Cir. 1975); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. After Scheuer federal officers should at least be denied absolute immunity when the
claims against them are constitutionally based. See, e.g., Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (United States Attorney General and other high-ranking officials held not absolutely immune from liability for constitutional violations).
32. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
33. The students brought alcohol to a school social function.
34. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133,
1213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
35. 420 U.S. at 321-22. The Court specifically held that no immunity would attach to
the school official "if he knew or reasonablyshould have known that the action he took within
his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student
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Scheuer and Wood clearly establish that the good faith executive
"immunity" is a defense on the merits,3 8 dependent on the circumstances and motivation of the defendant established at trial,3" and
ordinarily not determinable on a motion to dismiss but subject to
the further factual development attendant to a motion for summary
judgment. 8 Although the Wood Court explicitly limited its holding
to "the specific context of school discipline," 3 the Court's general
phrasing of the qualified immunity standard led lower courts to
apply it to a variety of defendants."
In Imbler v. Pachtman,.41the Supreme Court refused to apply
the good faith immunity standard to a state prosecuting attorney.
Plaintiff, a convicted murderer who had been released after the
state prosecuting attorney revealed newly-discovered evidence,
brought suit against the prosecutor for alleged knowing use of false
evidence and suppression of material evidence at trial. After carefully analyzing the policy considerations underlying the common
law rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity,4 2 the Court held that
a prosecutor enjoys the same immunity from civil suit under section
affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights." Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
36. Developments in the Law, supra note 34, at 1213; see note 8 supra.
37. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,419 n.13 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
at 242-49.
38. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 249-50; Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472
F.2d 732, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1973); Greenlow v. California Dep't of Benefit Payments, 413 F.
Supp. 420, 425-27 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
39. 420 U.S. at 322.
40. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of a state mental
hospital); Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975) (prison administrators); Glasson
v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.) (police officer), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975);
M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (city councilman,
planning commissioner); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (attorney
general).
41. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
42. The Court stated that granting only qualified immunity to a prosecutor would
disserve the public interest by preventing vigorous and fearless performance of duties essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system: (1) a prosecutor's independence
in bringing and conducting suit would be constrained by the possibility of his own potential
liability in suits for damages; (2) frequent suits would divert the prosecutor's energy and
attention from enforcement of the law; (3) the honest prosecutor would face danger of liability; (4) defending suits long after decisions are made imposes unique and intolerable burdens
upon a prosecutor responsible for hundreds of suits annually; (5) a prosecutor would face
greater difficulty in meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other administrative
and executive officials; (6) the veracity of witnesses is frequently in doubt and triers of fact
would be denied relevant information since a prosecutor would be hesitant to use such witnesses through concern for personal liability; (7) the ultimate fairness of the system could be
weakened in post-trial procedures if there is a possibility that a post-trial decision in favor of
the defendant might subject the prosecutor to suit. Id. at 424-25. Comparethis list of concerns
with note 9 supra.
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1983 that he enjoyed for malicious prosecution actions at common
law. 3 Although the Court purported to accept Judge Learned
Hand's "balancing of evils,"' 4 which balances the nature of prosecutorial conduct causing an injury against the degree of impairment
of prosecutorial functions caused by subjecting a prosecutor to liability, 5 it rested its decision on its belief that "the alternative of
qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest." The Court expressly avoided the issue whether a balancing would require absolute immunity for a prosecutor's responsibilities that cast him in the role of an administrative or investigative
47
officer rather than in the role of an advocate.
Two post-Imbler decisions by the Third Circuit touched the
issue of prosecutorial immunity in an action brought under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents.4" In Brawer v. Horowitz" the court
determined that a prosecutor's advocatory role encompassed his
attempts to solicit perjured testimony' and conceal exculpatory
43. 424 U.S. at 424.
44. The Court quoted the reasoning of Judge Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950):
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
45. Judge Hand expressed his concerns as follows:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected
with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and,
if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to subject all
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.... There must indeed be
means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite
another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone
who has suffered from their errors.
Id.
46. 424 U.S. at 427.
47. Id. at 430-31. The Court rejected any distinction between presentation of perjured
testimony and suppression of evidence.
48. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens the Supreme Court established that federal law
enforcement officers' violations of fourth amendment rights give rise to a federal civil cause
of action analogous to the § 1983 action against state officials. Numerous lower federal courts
have interpreted Bivens as creating a cause of action for damages arising from the violation
of any constitutional right by a federal official. Other courts have read the leading case more
narrowly, restricting its impact to fourth amendment violations. Briggs v. Goodwin, No. 751642, slip op. at 12-13 n.8 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 1977).
49. 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976).
50. A second issue addressed in Brawer was that of immunity for a witness who deliberately gave false testimony under oath during a federal proceeding. Assuming arguendo that
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evidence. The court thus held that the prosecutor was entitled to
absolute immunity under Imbler 1 In Helstoski v. Goldstein," however, the court held that deliberate prosecutorial leaks of false information designed to damage plaintiff's political prospects fell outside
the rationale for absolute immunity set forth in Imbler. Because the
Helstoski court did not address fully the investigative-advocatory
distinction, its rationale does not establish clearly whether the court
based its decision on a characterization of the activity as investigative or on a determination that such activity fell outside the scope
of prosecutorial authority.53 Although both cases accepted an apparent investigative exception to Imbler's immunity doctrine, neither
offered a definitive interpretation of the scope of such an exception.
The instant case represents the first judicial attempt to define the
investigative exception to a prosecutor's absolute liability.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

After acknowledging that the prosecutor's testimony before the
grand jury fell within "general matters committed by law to his
control or supervision,"5 4 the instant court addressed the issue
whether the defendant's conduct fell within the scope of prosecutorial immunity granted by Imbler. The court stressed Imbler's failure to determine whether public policy considerations that dictate
recognition of absolute immunity when a prosecutor engages in advocatory activities5 5 compel a similar result when he engages in
a Bitens action would lie against a witness at a federal trial, the court followed the Imbler
analysis, weighing the common law immunities and policy considerations and then adopting
them. Id. at 836-37.
51. The court held that federal prosecutors sued under a Bivens theory should be
accorded the same immunities as state officials sued under § 1983. The court acknowledged
the distinction between investigative and advocatory roles, but charcterized Horowitz's role
as advocatory with no explanation. Id. at 834.
52. 552 F.2d 564 (1977).
53. In an equivocal explanation the court stated:

Even if absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to the administrative and investigative
functions of a United States Attorney, it is our opinion that certain paragraphs of Mr.
Helstoski's complaint aver conduct which goes beyond the proper performance of these
aspects of a prosecutor's job.... It would appear that such activity, if it occurred would
lie outside of the rationale for absolute immunity set forth in Imbler. At most, it would
be subject to a qualified good-faith immunity.
Id. at 566.
54. Briggs v. Goodwin, slip op. at 9 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)).
The instant court also assumed Bivens authorized constitutional actions against federal
officers to the same extent that § 1983 allows similar litigation against state functionaries.
They left the question to be decided by the district court at the appropriate time. Id. at 13
n.8.
55. See notes 9 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
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essentially investigative activities." Analyzing pre-Imbler circuit
court decisions, the court discerned that the decisions distinguished
between a prosecutor's judicial functions and his investigative activities and concluded that a prosecutor functioning primarily as an
investigator should be accorded only the qualified immunity conferred on other investigative officers." To determine whether the
nature of defendant's activity was investigative, the court focused
on its relationship to the trial proceeding. 8 Although the defendant's statement was made under oath in open court, the court
found that such statement was related essentially to his investigative activities and not related directly to his judicial functions. "'
Accordingly, the court found that the prosecutor's protection from
liability was a qualified immunity dependent on a showing that he
entertained a good faith reasonable belief of the truth of his response.6
56. Briggs v. Goodwin, slip op. at 16-20.
57. Id. at 20; see note 23 supra.
58. The court stated:
Throughout the [Imbler] Court's opinion, the concentration on claims likely to
arise from prosecutorial behavior at or immediately before trial is manifest. . . . All of
the worrisome issues thus enumerated by the [Imbler] Court involve possible prosecutorial errors of commission or omission in connection with the trial of a criminal case
. . . . Although [Imbler] makes clear that a prosecutor's advocacy function does extend beyond the confines of the trial courtroom, the examples of such preliminary advocate activities provided by the Supreme Court are instructive for their common focus
on a particular criminal proceeding.
Briggs v. Goodwin, slip op. at 15-17 (emphasis is the Court's).
59. As stated by the court:
[Aippellant's alleged perjury bears no relation whatever to the advocate's role as conceived by the Supreme Court in Imbler. The obligation to disclose, pursuant to judicial
direction, the presence of Government informants among those subpoenaed to testify
before the grand jury is entirely foreign to advocacy issues such as whether to initiate a
prosecution or how to conduct a prosecution once begun. Such disclosure was, rather,
an action required of appellant by the court in order to enable the court to deal with a
possible defect in the conditions under which subpoena compulsions had been brought
to bear in the grand jury investigation.
Id. at 21.
60. See notes 26-38 supra and accompanying text. Additionally, since two of the three
judges desired to avoid further trial court proceedings if the appellant was shielded by any
kind of absolute immunity, the court addressed the witness immunity pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. See Abney v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2034
(1977). Judge McGowan felt that the witness immunity issue was preserved in the record and
available for review upon appeal of any final judgment on the action. Briggs v. Goodwin, slip
op. at 31 n.14. The majority concluded that the issue of witness immunity was not relevant
to a determination of the prosecutor's liability for suit. The court stressed that had Goodwin
merely volunteered the information as an officer of the court there would have been no witness
immunity question. The difference between the falsity of a nontestimonial representation and
the technical consequence of perjury attached to a statement under oath was not deemed
determinative of the immunity issue here. Id. at 32.
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A lengthy and vigorous dissent charged the majority with creating a specious distinction between advocatory and investigativeadministrative activities. According to the dissent, the prosecutor's
action before a judge during a grand jury proceeding was clearly one
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,"' and as such was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity
under Imbler.62 The dissent stressed that every example of prosecutorial activity described by the Imbler Court as administrative or
investigative, unlike the prosecutor's conduct in the instant case,
occurred outside the courtroom and courthouse.6 3
IV.

COMMENT

As the first circuit court decision to adopt explicitly the Imbler
investigative-advocatory distinction,64 the instant opinion demonstrates that the distinction serves to sharpen rather than resolve the
issue of prosecutorial immunity. The court's distinction between a
prosecutor's advocatory and investigative conduct allows identical
acts to be treated differently merely because a court might place
them in different prosecutorial roles. For example, the court's equation of the advocatory role of a prosecutor with his functions at trial
brings within the Imbler immunity perjured testimony given during
the course of formal trial proceedings. 5 The same testimony given
in a grand jury proceeding is not immune under the ImbIer doctrine,
however, because the court places the prosecutor's actions in such
a proceeding within the scope of his investigative role. Although the
court's dictinction is consistent with Imbler'sprecise holding, which
granted immunity for both willful suppression of exculpatory evidence and willful use of perjured testimony at trial, 6 the court ignores Imbler's command that similar acts should be treated equally
irrespective of the context in which they arise. 7
The dissent's conclusion that no conduct inside a courtroom is
investigative suggests a locational distinction that ignores the argu61. Briggs v. Goodwin, slip op. at 6 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 430).
62. Additionally, the dissent alleged that Goodwin was entitled to absolute witness
immunity for his sworn answer before the judge. Though the issue was neither briefed nor
argued, the dissent raised the arguments that might be expected to be utilized on remand of
the case.
63. Briggs v. Goodwin, slip op. at 4 n.10 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
64. The Third Circuit decision in Helstoski v. Goldstein is inconclusive. See notes 5253 supra and accompanying text.
65. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
66. 424 U.S. at 431 n.34.
67. Id.
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ably advocatory or "judicial" nature of decisions to indict, prosecute, or dismiss as well as choices of witnesses and evidence, all of
which occur outside the courtroom. Although such decisions and
choices at some point may become truly investigative in nature, a
dividing line cannot be drawn by use of the dissent's analysis. Moreover, the Imbler dictum impliedly repudiates a distinction based on
location of the conduct by rejecting the argument that no conduct
outside the courtroom may be advocatory. 8
A more manageable distinction for imposing liability is to extend the Learned Hand balancing test.' The critical factors in determining liability thus should be: (1) the nature of the prosecutorial conduct causing the alleged injury, and (2) the degree of impairment of prosecutorial functions caused by subjecting a prosecutor to liability.7 0 In cases in which the nature of a prosecutor's activity is such that the existence of liability will deter him from effective
performance of his duties or protection of the constitutional rights
of others, the balance should be struck in favor of immunity. 71
Imbler was such a case since the exculpatory evidence which led to
the plaintiffs release on habeas corpus might not have been revealed by a prosecutor who was not immune from suit. In cases such
as the instant case, however, because the existence of a private
damage cause of action will encourage the prosecutor to exercise his
duties with vigor, integrity, and honesty, justice demands that a
cause of action be made available to citizens aggrieved by a prosecutor's conduct. Prosecutors will be less likely to falsify their responses
to judicial inquiries if such conduct will subject them to civil liability. By employing a balancing test to determine prosecutorial immunity, courts will ensure that similar reprehensible acts will not
be treated differently under the Imbler immunity doctrine.
The lack of guidance provided by Imbler adds confusion to the
struggle to articulate a rational dividing line between conduct that
falls within and conduct that falls outside the scope of prosecutorial
immunity. The instant decision indicates that absolute prosecutorial immunity in all situations is neither feasible nor desirable,
but it also illustrates that inconsistency inheres in any less than an
absolute standard for immunity. If the Supreme Court intends to
afford a prosecutor absolute immunity from suit, it should address
the issue explicitly. Otherwise, it should adopt the impairment-of68. Id. at 431 n.33.
69.
70.
71.

See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
See Kattan, supra note 28, at 965.
Id. at 966.
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function balancing test, which can be applied consistently to a prosecutor's various activities whether they are advocatory or investigative in nature.
CORNELIA ANNE CLARK

Securities Law-Rule 10b-5-Defense of In Pari
Delicto Bars Private Damage Action Brought
Against Tipper by Tippee Who Fails to
Disclose Before Trading
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Tippees' brought a private action for damages under section
10(b) 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-53 charging that defendant tippers4 disseminated false and misleading mate1. For the purposes of this discussion a "tipper" is a person who possesses material
inside information on corporate affairs and who makes selective disclosure of such information for trading or other personal purposes. A "tippee" is one who receives such information
from a "tipper." See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 3
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATON 1450-51 (2d ed. 1961).
Plaintiff tippees were three individual investors who purchased more than 2,500 shares
of Meridian Industries, Inc., common stock.
2. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as the 1934
Act], 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), promulgated in 1942 pursuant to the
SEC's rulemaking authority, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange . ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
4. Defendant tippers were Pittsburgh National Bank and one of its officers.
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rial inside information5 in advising plaintiffs of an imminent merger
between two corporations that would result in appreciated stock
values.' In reliance on this information, plaintiffs purchased stock
in one of the corporations and subsequently incurred substantial
losses on the stock when the proposed merger did not occur.7 Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the doctrine of
in paridelicto8 barred plaintiffs' recovery because plaintiffs also had
violated rule 10b-5 by failing to make full disclosure of the inside
information before trading on the open market.' The district court
granted the tippers' motion for summary judgment."° On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held,
affirmed. When a tippee violates rule 10b-5 by failing to make full
disclosure to the investing public of material inside information
prior to trading on the open market, the defense of in pari delicto
bars a rule 10b-5 private damage action by the tippee against the
tipper. Tarasi v. PittsburghNational Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.
1977).
11.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
10b-5 prohibit the use of material inside information in securities
transactions prior to the disclosure of such information to the in5. Material information reveals the earnings, distributions, and probable future of a
corporation and affects a reasonable investor's decision to buy, sell, or hold the corporation's
securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
6. Defendant bank officer had discussed explicitly the proposed merger with two of the

plaintiffs and had given the third plaintiff express assurance that Meridian was "good stock."
7. Plaintiffs' losses totaled $22,000.
8. In pari delicto is an equitable defense judicially invoked to bar a plaintiff's action
when both parties are equally or mutually engaged in illegal conduct. 1 J. PoMEmoY, EQurry

942 (5th ed. 1941). The defense is based primarily on the court's desire to
protect its integrity by declining to be used as an instrument of the wrongdoer and on the
principle that a wrongdoer should not be permitted to profit from his misdeeds. See Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 151 (1968) (Marshall, J.,
JURISPRUDENCE

concurring in the result); Note, In PariDelicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust
Suits, 78 HA4v. L. Rav. 1241, 1242 (1965).
9. In promulgating rule 10b-5, the SEC established the policy of equal disclosure to
ensure to all trading parties equal access to information affecting their decisions. SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). According to the courts, 10b-5
thus requires anyone possessing material inside information to either disclose it to the investing public or abstain from trading on or recommending stock until disclosure is made. 401
F.2d at 848.
10. The suit was brought initially in the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.
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vesting public." This prohibition and the concurrent sanctions provided12 by the Securities Exchange Act apply to tippees as well as
to tippers. 3 Furthermore, although the Act does not provide explicitly for private damage actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
such actions have been implied judicially by reliance on the broad
purpose of the Act to regulate securities transactions and to eliminate fraudulent conduct.'4 Consequently, when a nondisclosing tippee brings a private action to recoup losses stemming from a false
or misleading tip given by the defendant tipper, the court must
choose between allowing recovery to the tippee because he has been
victimized by the tipper's fraudulent conduct, or denying recovery
to the tippee on the ground of in pari delicto because he also has
violated rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose. The courts denying the
tippee recovery have viewed him as a joint tortfeasor who should not
be permitted to escape liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
by seeking indemnification from his fellow tortfeasor." Other courts,
relying on the overriding purpose of the Securities Exchange Act to
ensure full disclosure of all material inside information prior to trading, have permitted nondisclosing tippees to recover from tippers,
reasoning that an additional basis of liability will encourage tippers
11. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
In re Investors Management Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,163 (S.E.C. 1971).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter, or the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof, or any
person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under this subchapter, makes any
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
13. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). For a discussion of tippee liability under rule 10b-5, see
Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 47 (1971); Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule lOb-5,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55; Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 860,
930-36 (1972).
14. The federal judiciary first found an implied private action under the section and
the rule in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and
the United States Supreme Court confirmed the right in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964) and in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). See also
Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620 (1966); Note,
Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 HAav. L. REv. 858 (1948).
15. E.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 28-31 infra.
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to forbear from initially disseminating inside information." Thus
the propriety of applying the in pari delicto defense in private actions by tippees under rule 10b-5 presents conflicting policy considerations that have not been resolved conclusively by the courts.
Some lower courts,'7 ruling on the availability of in pari delicto
in a securities action, have relied on the antitrust decision handed
down by the Supreme Court in PermaLife Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp."1These courts have viewed PermaLife as having
significant securities law implications because of the analogous enforcement policies underlying both the antitrust and the securities
statutory schemes." In refusing to recognize in pari delicto as a
defense to an antitrust action,2 the Perma Life Court concluded
that the strong public policy in favor of competition is best served
by ensuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat
to deter those contemplating violation of the antitrust laws. 21 The
Court also noted in dictum the impropriety of invoking broad common law22barriers to relief when a private suit serves an important
purpose.
Some courts have relied upon the Perma Life reasoning and
dictum to limit or exclude the defense of in pari delicto.2 In
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon,Inc.,24 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, following the PermaLife approach,
noted at the outset that the basic question was not whether the
parties were equally at fault, but rather whether allowing in pari
delicto promoted the primary purpose of the securities laws, the
protection of the investing public. 25 The Nathansoncourt concluded
that such a purpose is best furthered by disallowing the in pari
16. E.g., Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See notes 24-26 infra and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
18. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
19. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Note, The Demise of In Pari
Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CAL F. L. Rxv. 572, 603-04
(1972).
20. 392 U.S. at 140.
21. Id. at 139.
22. Id. at 138. The Court's assertion, however, may be limited in scope since both cases

cited to support its statement were antitrust actions.
23. See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
24. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
25. The court held that a plaintiff's fraudulent conduct is only one factor to be weighed

in determining the availability of the inpari delicto defense. The court did not state, however,
how much weight should be afforded the plaintiff's conduct.
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delicto defense and holding the tipper liable regardless of the degree
of tippee culpability, thus discouraging the tipper from making the
26
initial selective disclosure.
Other courts have viewed Perma Life's disallowance of the defense as limited to its facts and have noted that the opinion as a
whole manifests a recognition that a plaintiff who shares substantially equal fault may be barred from recovery, notwithstanding the
public policy favoring private enforcement.Y Approximately one
year after the Perma Life decision, the Fifth Circuit, in Kuehnert
v. Texstar Corp.,'2 allowed the in pari delicto defense in a tippeetipper suit brought under rule 10b-5. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that when a plaintiffs fraudulent intent is clear,2 9 permitting the
defense provides a strong deterrent to rule 10b-5 violations by tippees. The tippee thus knows that if the information is false, he is
left with no legal recourse to recoup his losses,3" and that if the
information is true, he may be liable to the person with whom he
has traded.'
Still other courts, in determining the applicability of in pari
delicto, have considered the plaintiff's relative magnitude of culpability, emphasizing the nature and degree of plaintiffs participation
in the illicit securities transaction. In Katz v. Amos,32 the court held
that the plaintiff's subsequent transfers of unregistered stock to
third parties in violation 3 of the 1933 Securities Act constituted
transactions separate from plaintiffs purchase of the stock from the
defendant. Thus the court denied the in pari delicto defense since
plaintiff's illegal conduct was not sufficiently connected to defendant's violation. In James v. DuBreuil,4 however, the court found
plaintiffs willingness to backdate certain documents illegally to be
26. The court reasoned that by denying the defense, the would-be tipper, aware of
potential litigation should his tip prove unprofitable, will be deterred from making any
selective disclosure of inside information. 325 F. Supp. at 58.
27. E.g., James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,
412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
28. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. In Kuehnert plaintiff bought stock in defendant corporation on the strength of false
inside information with the knowledge that nondisclosure before trading was improper. 412
F.2d at 702.
30. According to the court, allowing recovery would give the tippee an enforceable
warranty that the information was true and therefore would encourage 10b-5 violations. 412
F.2d at 705.
31. See also Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
32. 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
33. Plaintiff had violated § 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1)
(1970), which prohibits the sale of unregistered securities.
34. 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974).
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an essential part of the transaction claimed by plaintiff to be fraudulent.3 5 Stressing plaintiff's intent to consummate and profit from
an obviously unlawful transaction, 8 the court allowed in pari
delicto. The rule emerging from these cases is that when a plaintiff's
violation constitutes a vital part of the transaction of which he
complains and when plaintiff's culpability roughly equals in magnitude that of the defendant, plaintiff should be barred from recov37
ery.
By automatically disallowing the in pari delicto defense whenever enforcement of statutory regulations is promoted by private
actions, decisions such as Nathanson indicate that some courts do
not view the degree of plaintiff culpability as a significant factor in
determining the applicability of the defense.3 8 Other courts, such as
those in Kuehnert, Katz, and DuBreuil, however, have regarded
degree of plaintiff culpability as an important element in assessing
the propriety of the defense in a securities action. The latter approach requires some standard by which to determine when a plaintiff s culpability is substantially equal to a defendant's so as to
trigger the application of the defense. The Supreme Court's decision
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder3' suggests a framework by which the
lower courts can evaluate a plaintiff's culpability. In Hochfelder the
Court reviewed section 10(b), its legislative history, and the administrative history 0 of rule 10b-5, and without discussing the public
policy issues,4 ' concluded that an allegation of scienter is required
in a private action for damages.4 2 In construing the language of
section 10(b) the Court relied upon terms within the statute strongly
suggesting that section 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or
35. In DuBreuil, defendant, an insider of a merging bank, persuaded plaintiff to sell
defendant his shares in the bank on the pretext that their value would appreciate when placed
in a nonexistent "organizers' trust." Plaintiff had agreed to backdate the transfer documents
so that sale of the stock to the insider during the merger period would appear legal under a
rule then in effect. 500 F.2d at 156-57, 159.
36. Id. at 157-58.
37. This rule reflects the notion posited in Perma Life that a full participant in a
statutory violation may not be immune from liability. 392 U.S. at 140. See also Comment,
Securities Actions: Equitable Defenses and the Good Faith Defense for "Controlling Persons," 44 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 1173, 1180 (1976).
38. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
39. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
40. For a summary of the legislative history of § 10(b), see A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrms
LAw: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2, at 331-40, and for a summary of the administrative
history of rule 10b-5, see A. JcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 5.02, at 1-108 to -113 (1974).
41. Finding the language and legislative history of § 10(b) dispositive, the Court declined to consider matters of policy. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
42. Id. at 193.
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intentional misconduct.13 Examining the section's legislative history,44 the Court found evidence that Congress did not intend one
to be liable for prohibited practices unless he acted in bad faith.
The utility of the Hochfelder decision, however, is limited by
the ambiguous standard posited for the mental state necessary to
establish 10b-5 liability. Because the Court found an absence of an
expansive congressional intent in enacting section 10(b), it refused
to extend coverage of the section to private actions for damages
based on negligence alone.4" Unfortunately, despite the Court's initial definition of scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"4 6 the Court expressly declined to
decide whether reckless behavior is sufficient47 and did not discuss
whether knowledge without proof of intent to deceive will impose
civil liability. The decision, however, has provided federal courts a
foundation with which to begin a formal evaluation of the scienter
standard.
Absent empirical evidence assessing the effectiveness of the in
pari delicto defense in enforcing security regulations and without a
legislative pronouncement or an authoritative Supreme Court ruling as to the propriety of the defense in tippee-tipper suits, the lower
courts must continue to exercise discretion in applying this common
law barrier to relief. When a court determines that public policy
favors the invocation of the defense, equality of fault must be
established. Because Congress apparently has relegated the task of
implying the rights and liabilities under 10b-5 to the judiciary, each
new tippee-tipper case affords the courts an opportunity to reexamine both the propriety of the application of in pari delicto in a 10b5 action and the standard by which to evaluate plaintiff's culpability under section 10b and rule 10b-5.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In determining whether to grant the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the instant court 8 adopted the two-part analytical framework developed in PermaLife. Accordingly, the court
initially inquired whether the unlawful conduct of the tippees was
43. The Court particularly was persuaded by the use of such terms as "manipulative,"
"device," and "contrivance," all of which tend to evince an element of intent. Id. at 199.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. 425 U.S. at 214.
46. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
47. Id.
48. Judge Adams delivered the opinion of the court in which Judges Kalodner and
Hunter concurred.

1978]

RECENT CASES

substantially equal to that of the tippers, thereby warranting invocation of the in pari delicto defense." The court determined that the
tippees' voluntary, illegal conduct was of sufficient magnitude and
had sufficient causal relation to their losses to render their conduct
as culpable as the behavior of defendants." The second phase of the
court's inquiry focused on whether the purposes of the 1934 Act in
general, and rule 10b-5 in particular, are better served by subjecting
the tipper to liability for his misrepresentation or by denying the
tippee relief if he accepts and trades upon inside information that
later proves to be false. After limiting PermaLife's denial of in pari
delicto to its facts,"1 the court concluded that when the parties are
of substantially equal fault, permitting the in pari delicto defense
more effectively deters 10b-5 violations.
The court grounded its opinion in both practical and theoretical
considerations. From a practical standpoint, the court observed that
discouraging a tippee's use of inside information abates the flow of
all inside information, not simply that for which a tipper may be
held liable.5 2 Furthermore, the court maintained that elimination of
a
the defense actually might encourage tippee violations by giving 53
tippee an enforceable warranty that the inside information is true.
The court also noted that tippers are deterred substantially by the
possibility of SEC and criminal actions and private suits by nontippee purchasers and sellers who have been affected adversely. Consequently, permitting the defense would not detract significantly from
the deterrence of tipper violations.
As a theoretical justification for its decision, the court stated
that its position effectuated the underlying policy of the in pari
49. See note 8 supra.

50. Although the court acknowledged in a footnote that 10b-5 liability is limited by the
Hochfelder scienter requirement, it failed to address specifically that issue in the instant case.
555 F.2d at 1163 n.54. Rather than basing its determination of the applicability of the in pari
delicto defense on an analysis of plaintiff culpability, the court seemed to regard the causal
relationship between plaintiffs' conduct and their injury as sufficient to render the plaintiffs
in equal fault with the defendants. Id. at 1162.
51. The court maintained that in Perma Life the plaintiffs' participation in the illegal
agreement was passive and perhaps coerced in contrastlto the present plaintiffs' active,
voluntary involvement in the wrongdoing. The court explained Perma Life's denial of the
defense by reasoning that application of in pari delicto to passively involved plaintiffs would
not serve the purposes of the antitrust laws because such application would not deter future
violations and might undermine the effectiveness of treble damage actions. Id. at 1163-64.
52. The court observed that the absence of the defense would have the greatest deterrence to would-be deliberate purveyors of false information since they would be liable to
tippees. In light of the Hochfelder requirement of scienter, it is uncertain whether tippers
believing their tips to be true would be forestalled from disseminating inside information by
the threat of tippee suits.
53. See note 30 supraand accompanying text.
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delicto defense-protecting the integrity of the courts and preventing wrongdoers from profiting from their misdeeds." The court also
observed that the invocation of the defense is stronger in the securities context than in the antitrust field because it is more appropriate
to engraft judicially fashioned defenses onto judicially implied
causes of action than to engraft such defenses onto causes of action
provided by statutory enactments."5 Thus the court determined that
rule 10b-5 enforcement considerations mandate invocation of the in
pari delicto defense.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision evidences the Third Circuit's attempt to
achieve both equitable results and effective 10b-5 enforcement by
examining the conduct of the parties and balancing the equities in
each case before imposing liability in a tippee-tipper suit. The balancing approach employed by the court adopts the Perma Life,"6
Katz, and DuBreui57 position that a plaintiff should be barred from
recovery when his violation constitutes a part of the transaction of
which he complains and when his culpability essentially equals that
of the defendant. The court clearly rejects Nathanson's inelastic
adherence to broad policy rules," which implies a full recovery to a
tippee regardless of his fraudulent activities, because absent a realistic weighing of the specific equities in each case, culpable plaintiffs might be rewarded and the protective purpose of 10b-5 effectively defeated when the defrauding tippee's conduct is as injurious
to the investing public as the conduct of the defrauding tipper. The
Hochfelder requirement that scienter be shown in order to impose
10b-5 liability further supports the instant holding since this stricter
standard of conduct presumably applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.5 9
Although the court employed an exhaustive and well-reasoned
analysis to decide the propriety of the in pari delicto defense in a
10b-5 action, its summary invocation of the defense in the instant
case failed to consider adequately whether the parties' conduct
placed them in pari delicto. The application of the in pari delicto
54. See note 8 supra.
55. Private antitrust actions are provided for in § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1964). Private suits under the securities laws, however, have been judicially implied. See
note 14 supra.
56. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text.
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defense traditionally has required a court to scrutinize the conduct
of the parties in order to determine their relative fault. 0 Furthermore, in view of the scienter requirement imposed by Hochfelder, a
court invoking the inparidelicto defense in a 10b-5 action must find
scienter on the part of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The
court's apparent assumption that the tippee's conduct after receipt
of the inside information was as culpable as the behavior of the
defendant ignores Hochfelder's scienter requirement. Thus the
court's failure to ascertain the relative degree of tippee culpability
before imposing liability under rule 10b-5 departs from both common law principles and the Supreme Court's interpretation of rule
10b-5.
The de minimis standard employed by the court for reprovable
tippee participation clearly risks overinclusiveness by threatening
the imposition of liability for nonculpable behavior. 1 The court's
strict and apparently indiscriminate sanction on tippee conduct
evidences a punitive policy that often might defeat the protective
purpose of rule 10b-5. Additionally, by automatically invoking the
in pari delicto defense without a realistic balancing of the equities
of the parties, the court adopts an approach that resembles in form
the Nathanson analysis, which the court regarded as effectively
undermining the protective purposes of rule 10b-5. Although the
court correctly perceived that rule 10b-5 is sufficiently expansive to
cover tippees, its interpretation should have distinguished between
tippees possessing scienter and tippees whose conduct is less culpable. By failing to make such a distinction, the court risks invoking
the sanctions of rule 10b-5 to punish those investors whom the rule
was designed to protect.
Although the court correctly concludes that determination of
the propriety of the in pari delicto defense in securities actions
should be left to the discretion of the court, courts must proceed
cautiously in exercising such discretion. They should apply the
standard of conduct set forth in Hochfelder in determining whether
a plaintiff and defendant have engaged in the substantially equal
conduct necessary to invoke the inparidelicto defense. Because the
existence of scienter by the plaintiff tippee always will constitute a
material issue to be resolved on the basis of the evidence proferred
60. See note 8 supra.
61. See note 51 supra. Some commentators have suggested that the standard of proof
for actions against tippees should be even stricter than that for tipper actions. See Bromberg,
CorporateInformation: Texas Gulf Sulphur and its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731, 747-49
(1968).
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by both parties, a court recognizing the propriety of the in pari
delicto defense will be compelled to reach the merits of the case
before ruling on the applicability of the defense in a 10b-5 tippeetipper suit.
I.

TERRY CURRIE

Torts-Negligence-Child Has Cause of Action for
Preconception Medical Malpractice
I.

FAcTs AND HOLDING

Plaintiff, claiming that she suffered permanent physical injuries' as a result of defendants' conduct prior to her conception,
sought to recover damages in a negligence action.2 In 1965 plaintiffs
mother, 3 who had Rh negative blood, was given two transfusions of
incompatible Rh positive blood4 in defendant hospital where defendant physician was director of laboratories.' Plaintiff's mother did
not discover that these transfusions had sensitized her blood until
shortly before plaintiffs birth in 1973.6 Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, arguing that because
plaintiff had not been conceived at the time of the alleged negligent
conduct, defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiff. The trial
1. Plaintiff alleged permanent damage to various organs, including her brain and nervous system. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (Ill. 1977).
2. The complaint also alleged willful and wanton misconduct by the defendants. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants had discovered that improper transfusions had been given
to plaintiff's mother but had failed to notify plaintiff's mother or her family. Id. This claim
was not considered on appeal.
3. At the time of the alleged misconduct, plaintiff's mother was thirteen years old. Id.
4. A person whose blood contains the Rh factor, a substance causing the formation of
antibodies in the blood, has Rh positive blood. About 85% of all people are Rh positive. The
remaining 15% of the population is Rh negative. When Rh positive blood is transferred into
the system of a person having Rh negative blood, "sensitization" results, making the blood
antagonistic to future transfusions. 2 ArroRNEY's DIcmoNARY OF MEmicI
R-39 (J. Schmidt
ed. 1975).
5. The complaint alleged that the hospital, the director of laboratories, and their agents
were in complete control of the selection of blood to be used in the two 500 c.c. transfusions.
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
6. The mother's physician discovered defendants' error during a routine blood screening
performed as a part of prenatal care. The mother's physician induced labor to bring about
the premature birth of plaintiff because his diagnosis had determined that the life of the
unborn child was in jeopardy. At birth the plaintiff suffered from hyperbilirubinemia, necessitating immediate, complete exchange transfusions of her blood. Id. The primary symptom of
hyperbilirubinemia is an abnormally large amount of bilirubin, a red bile pigment formed
from hemoglobin, circulating in the blood, which may result in jaundice if its concentration
is sufficient. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcrIONARY 668 (4th ed. 1976).
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court 7 granted defendants' motion, but the Illinois Appellate Court
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings." On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Illinois, held, affirmed. A child injured by
the negligent acts of a physician and a hospital committed against
his mother prior to his conception has a cause of action based on
negligence. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill.
1977).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 1946 courts generally denied recovery to children who
allegedly were injured as a result of prenatal negligent conduct.,
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,'" the first American case
to deal with the issue, held that the administrator of the estate of a
child who had survived for only a few minutes after his negligentlycaused premature birth" could not maintain a wrongful death action." Noting the absence of precedent, the court reasoned that
because the common law courts had considered an unborn child to
be a part of the mother, only she could recover damages. 3 The
Supreme Court of Illinois in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital4 also
employed the common law idea that prior to birth a child did not
have a "distinct and independent existence"' 5 to deny a child's
cause of action for injuries allegedly suffered in an accident during
the prenatal period. 6 The dissent, however, argued that neither the
lack of precedent nor the common law's characterization of the unborn child as a part of its mother justified denying a child's cause
of action to redress prenatal injuries. Because medical science had
shown that a fetus could survive the death of its mother and was
7. The trial court was the Circuit Court of McLean County.
8. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Dl1. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976). See Note,
Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. Rav. 706 (1977); 10 J. MAR.
J. PRAC. & PRO. 417 (1977).
9. W. PROSSER, THE LAW

OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). Justice Holmes wrote the court's opinion.
11. The mother of the deceased child, during her fourth or fifth month of pregnancy,
slipped on a defect in a public highway, fell, and subsequently suffered a miscarriage. Id. at
14-15.
12. The court found that the deceased was not a "person" under the administration
statute. 1882 Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 52, § 17.
13. 138 Mass. at 17.
14. 184 Il. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 365, 56 N.E. at 639.
16. Plaintiff allegedly was injured in an accident on an elevator operated by defendant
hospital less than 10 days before his birth. Plaintiff's mother also suffered severe harm. Id.
at 359-63, 56 N.E. at 638.
17. Id. at 368-72, 56 N.E. at 640-41 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
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therefore a separate entity, the dissent concluded that the defendant owed a duty of ordinary care to the plaintiff during the prenatal period. 8
The ideas stated in the Allaire dissent emerged in 1946 as the
majority opinion in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 1 a decision that initiated a
sequence of cases rejecting the traditional rule."0 In Bonbrest, a
medical malpractice action, the court emphasized that at the time
of the claimed misconduct the plaintiff had been a viable fetus, and
subsequent to the misconduct plaintiff had been born alive. 21 The
court thus refused to find that the plaintiff had been merely a part
of her mother at the time of the negligent acts.2 2 The court also
rejected the policy argument raised by defendant that allowing a
cause of action in prenatal cases would lead to difficult proof problems and determined that proof of causation in such cases would be
no more difficult than in other medical malpractice actions.2
Although the cases that followed Bonbrest rejected the common
law rule expressed in Dietrich and Allaire, they generally did not
accept the viability criterion laid down by Bonbrest.24 The court in
Smith v. Brennan refused to apply the viability rule because experts could not determine positively that a fetus was viable at the
time of injury unless birth occurred immediately thereafter and the
child survived.28 Moreover, the court maintained that denying recovery because plaintiff could not prove that he was viable at the
time of the wrongful acts, even though he could prove that the acts
had caused the injury, was simply unjust.27 The court therefore
18. Id. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642.
19. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
20. These cases "brought about what was up till that time the most spectacular abrupt
reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts." PROSSER, supra note 9,
at § 55.
21. A fetus is viable when it is sufficiently developed to live outside the uterus.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1151.
22. 65 F. Supp. at 140. The court argued that although a viable unborn child depended
on its mother heavily, it was "not a 'part' of the mother in the sense of a constituent element."

Id.
23. Id. at 142-43; accord, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695
(1951); PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 55. The court concluded that the plaintiff's cause of action
should be recognized because "[T]he law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and
medical science certainly has made progress since 1884 [the date of Dietrich]." 65 F. Supp.
at 143.
24. Many courts indicated in dictum that recovery should be limited to plaintiffs who
were viable at the time of the misconduct, but when actually confronted with the issue, most
courts have allowed recovery for negligence occurring in the early part of pregnancy. PROSSER,
supra note 9, at § 55.
25. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
26. Id. at 367, 157 A.2d at 504.
27. Id. This injustice was the court's "primary consideration."
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concluded that a child has a separate, legally recognizable existence
from the moment of conception.2 8 Reaching the same result, the
court in Sinkler v. Kneale" emphasized the ability of medical science to demonstrate that a fetus has an existence separate from its
mother from the moment of conception. 3 The dissent in Sinkler was
concerned that the majority had made an unwarranted assessment
of the state of medical knowledge 3' and feared that the determination whether the alleged negligent conduct had proximately caused
the prenatal injury would, in most cases, be no more than "sheer
speculation. 32 Nevertheless, most courts that have considered cases
in which negligent conduct occurred early in pregnancy have agreed
that plaintiff's failure to prove that he was viable at the time of the
negligence should not bar recovery.33
Having permitted recovery for previability negligence, the
courts next faced the question whether negligence occurring prior to
conception also was actionable. In Zepeda v. Zepeda34 the court
indicated in dictum that a plaintiff might have a cause of action for
a wrongful act committed before he was conceived, reasoning that
"[i]t makes no difference how much time elapses between a wrongful act and a resulting injury if there is a causal relation between
them." 35 Prior to the instant case, however, only two cases had
considered the question whether a child's physical injuries36 caused
by preconception negligent conduct might give rise to a cause of
action. In the first of these cases, Jorgensenv. Meade JohnsonLaboratories,Inc.,31 plaintiff alleged that his mother's consumption of
28. Id. at 362, 157 A.2d at 502. The court cited several medical texts to show that a
child has a separate, medically-recognized existence from the moment of conception and
concluded that the law also should recognize this fact.
29. 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). In both Smith v. Brennan and Sinkler v. Kneale,
the plaintiffs' injuries allegedly were due to defendants' negligence in automobile accidents.
30. Id. at 272, 164 A.2d at 95.
31. The dissent considered the majority's conclusion on the state of medical knowledge
to be unsupported by the record of the case. Id. at 276, 164 A.2d at 97 (Bell, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 278, 164 A.2d at 98. See also PRoSSER, supra note 9, at § 55 n.33; Note, The
Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to PrenatalInjuries,-110 U. PA. L. REv.
554 (1962). The dissent's concern that inadequate medical knowledge would lead to "sheer
speculation" on the connection between the misconduct and injury should have been directed
to the element of causation in fact rather than the element of proximate cause. See notes 5659, 63 infra and accompanying text.
33. PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 55; see cases collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, 123052 (1971).
34. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
35. Id. at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853; see James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47
Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 788 (1953).
36. A cause of action has been allowed for fraudulent misrepresentations occurring prior
to plaintiff's conception. Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
37. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
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birth control pills manufactured by defendant had altered her chromosome structure and that plaintiff consequently had developed a
Mongoloid deformity during the prenatal period. 38 In deciding that
the plaintiff should have an opportunity to prove his allegations, the
court analogized the facts before it to a hypothetical situation39 in
which an infant, injured by a defective food product manufactured
before his conception, would have a cause of action. 0 Jorgensen's
utility to a plaintiff alleging preconception negligence might be limited because the court did not state clearly that a cause of action
for preconception misconduct could be predicated on negligence
alone.'
The second case to confront the question whether a cause of
action for preconception negligence could be maintained was Park
v. Chessin.4 2 In that case, decided by the trial court on a motion to
dismiss, plaintiff sought damages for physical injuries allegedly
caused by defendant physicians' negligent conduct prior to plaintiff's conception. 3 The court found that the plaintiff's birth had
been forseeable to the defendants when they committed the alleged
tortious acts 44 and that the defendants were or should have been

aware of the danger that plaintiff might be born with defects. 5
Although Park, like Jorgensen, evidences a judicial willingness to
recognize a cause of action for preconception negligence, its precedential value is limited since the issue of preconception liability was
decided at the trial level. The instant court is the first court of last
resort to consider whether preconception negligence gives rise to a
cause of action.
38. The plaintiff sought to hold defendant liable under theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. Remanding the case for proof on the
issues of causation in fact and proximate cause, the court did not indicate which claim would
entitle plaintiff to relief. Id. at 240-41; see note 52 infra.
39. Professor James has employed the same hypothetical to conclude that "the interests
within the range of peril" need not exist when the misconduct occurs to find liability. James,
supra note 35, at 788.
40. 483 F.2d at 240. The Jorgensen court stated that "the pleading should not be
construed as being limited to effects or developments before conception." Id. at 239. This
language demonstrates the court's recognition of the principle that the negligent conduct and
the alleged injury need not coincide for liability to accrue. Although the misconduct takes
place prior to conception, no injury to the plaintiff can occur until after that moment. See
note 35 supra and accompanying text. But see Comment, Radiationand PreconceptionInjuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 414, 418 n.27 (1974).
41. See note 38 supra.
42. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
43. The complaint alleged that the defendants negligently advised the plaintiff's parents that it would be safe to have children after one child had died of congenital kidney
disease.
44. 88 Misc. 2d at 228, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
45. Id. at 230, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
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III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

After assessing the historical development of the law of prenatal
torts, the instant court rejected the defendants' contention that a
plaintiff must allege that he was viable at the time of injury in order
to recover for negligently-inflicted harm.46 The court then sought to
determine a proper method for analyzing plaintiff's preconception
tort claim. In its view, both Jorgensen and Park had focused upon
causation in permitting a cause of action for preconception negligent conduct. The court, however, analyzed the case in terms of
duty, finding no reason to abandon the policy considerations traditionally defining duty merely to establish other policies for limiting
the element of causation in fact.4" Citing several medical authorities
on blood transfusions and prenatal defects and noting that defendants were a doctor and a hospital,4" the court determined that
plaintiff's injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the defendants at
the time of the alleged negligence. The court also found that advancements in medical science have made many prenatal injuries
preventable. Stating that duty should be determined not by foreseeability alone' but also by public policy, the court determined that
because plaintiff's injuries had been foreseeable to defendants and
because public policy required prevention of prenatal injuries whenever practicable, defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff even
though she had not been conceived at the time of the misconduct."
The court thus concluded that denying plaintiff's cause of action for
preconception negligence was no more defensible than denying a
46. The Supreme Court of Illinois had never considered the issue although the Appellate Court previously had abandoned the viability criterion. See Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App.
2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). The court recognized the trend toward abandonment of the
viability criterion, and in support of this trend cited medical authority to show that some
congenital defects develop only during previability stages. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367
N.E.2d at 1252-53.
47. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
48. Among the court's findings was the statement that routine Rh-typing had been a
standard medical practice since 1961. Id. at 1253.
49. The court found that the appellate court opinion had implied that a duty of care
existed whenever lack of care could foreseeably result in harm. Id.
50. The court found unpersuasive two policy arguments offered by the defendants.
First, defendants cited the potential for claims brought by successive generations of plaintiffs
against a single defendant for genetically-transmitted injuries. The court found the instant
case distinguishable because the alleged damage was not self-perpetuating and the plaintiff
was not a remote descendant. Second, the defendants pointed out that under the present
statute of limitations, a plaintiff could wait until he reached majority to assert a claim,
thereby creating a problem of defending against stale claims. The court argued that the
possibility of a stale claim was inherent in the adoption of the discovery rule and the present
statute of limitations. The likelihood that stale claims would be asserted was not sufficient
to deny a cause of action for preconception negligence. Id. at 1255.
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cause of action for prebirth or previability misconduct.
One member of the court concurred, 51 and three wrote separate
dissenting opinions.52 The principal dissent charged that the majority had abandoned the fault concept of negligence by paying mere
"lip service" to the traditional elements of foreseeability and duty
and had established causation as the sole determinant of liability."
The dissent objected to the majority's tacit acceptance of the policy
of compensating all injured individuals by spreading the risk of loss
over a broad base without regard for social consequences and competing policy considerations. 4 Finding that recognition of a duty of
care to a plaintiff not in existence at the time of the misconduct
would create an excessive economic burden on the public, the dissent concluded that such duty should not be recognized.55
IV.

COMMENT

The instant court properly chose to employ a duty analysis in
ruling on the motion to dismiss plaintiff's preconception negligence
claim. The court clearly could have assumed that the negligent
transfusions supervised by the defendants were the cause in fact of
plaintiffs injuries" and thus could have decided the case in terms
of proximate cause-a question of law.5 7 By focusing instead on the
element of duty as defined by foreseeability and public policy," the
51. Justice Dooley in a concurring opinion stated that the duty question was central to
a proper analysis of the instant case because, in his opinion, the factual question of causation
could not properly be before the court on a motion to dismiss. Additionally, he did not agree
with the majority's conclusion that Jorgensen and Park focused principally on causation. Id.
at 1257-61 (Dooley, J., concurring).
52. The dissents of Chief Justice Ward and Justice Underwood essentially agreed with
Justice Ryan's principal dissent. Justice Underwood found Jorgensenand Park unpersuasive
because he considered the former to have been decided on a strict liability theory and the
latter to be inappropriate because it was a trial court decision still in the process of appeal.
Id. at 1261-62 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
54. Convinced that the costs of risk spreading were no longer insignificant, the dissent
concluded that the public was neither willing nor able to absorb the economic burden caused
by the accelerating malpractice insurance rates and medical costs. The dissent reflects the
criticisms offered in Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1291
(1958), of the views expressed in F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956).
55. The dissent viewed the majority's holding as a "classic illustration of 'negligence
in the air.'" Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
56. The majority did not state specifically that it accepted all well-pleaded facts as true
for the purpose of considering the motion to dismiss. The concurrence, however, did point
out that such acceptance was proper in the instant case. See note 51 supra. See generally F.
JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 4.2 (1965).
57. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 42.
58. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. The court refused to rely on
Jorgensen and Park even though it is not clear that either was decided on questions of
causation.
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court was able to remand the case for the presentation of proof on
the issue of causation in fact. In a case involving preconception
malpractice, the plaintiff would have the burden of establishing by
means of expert medical testimony that the defendant's acts created a condition in the mother that in turn caused the plaintiff's
injuries. 5 Assuming that plaintiff proves causation in fact, the court
then could decide whether defendant's wrongful conduct was the
proximate, or legal, cause of plaintiff's injury on either a motion for
a directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The proximate cause question is essentially the same as the
duty question-whether, as a matter of social policy and justice, the
defendant should be held responsible for the consequences of his
misconduct."0 Although the policy assessment made in answering
the duty question should be restated in proximate cause language
at this procedural stage,"1 some cases will have been eliminated by
plaintiffs' failure to prove that defendants' malpractice was the
cause in fact of plaintiffs' injury. Using a duty analysis to deny the
defendant's motion to dismiss thus allows the element of causation
in fact to limit the number of cases that the court must decide on a
policy basis.
Although the instant court's duty analysis did not distinguish
between the negligence of a medical expert and the negligence of a
person possessing ordinary knowledge, future courts should limit
the duty to refrain from preconception negligence to those with
expert medical knowledge." The instant court recognized that pub59. See Note, supra note 32, at 568-69. Generally, proof of causation in fact in a medical
malpractice case is more difficult than in other types of negligence cases and normally requires presentation of expert testimony. Expert testimony in a malpractice case often involves
a description and evaluation of the victim's condition at various times during treatment.
Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36 MD. L. REV. 489, 511

(1977); see D.

LOUISELL

& H.

WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAcrIcE

§ 11.20 (1973). In the instant

case, for example, questions might be raised on the reasons for administering the transfusions
to plaintiff's mother and on the condition of her hemolitic system prior to the transfusions.
60. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at § 42. Proximate cause questions often are answered
by finding that the defendant owed no duty of care to plaintiff. Id.
61. In its effort to show that the decision was not grounded on a consideration of
causation, the instant court stated that it did not use causation because "new policy lines"
would have to be drawn. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. This unfortunate language may indicate that the court did not recognize the essential identity of the policy
considerations involved in the duty and proximate cause questions. The words may have been
intended, however, merely to emphasize the court's refusal to consider proximate cause at
the procedural level of the motion to dismiss.
62. In the three cases that have allowed a cause of action for preconception negligence,
the defendants were all chargeable with expert medical knowledge: in Jorgensen the defendant was a drug manufacturer and developer; in Park defendants were doctors; and in the
instant case defendants were a hospital and a physician who was director of laboratories.
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lic policy requires a physician to use his expert knowledge to prevent
injuries to children who have not yet been conceived 3 and consequently, imposed a duty on the expert defendants in order to regulate the future conduct of other experts in similar situations. Imposing a similar duty on nonexpert defendants, however, would do little
to regulate the conduct of other nonexperts. For example, a driver
who causes a collision could thereby physically damage a woman's
reproductive system, ultimately causing injury to a child born years
after the misconduct. Because traffic laws are designed to regulate
this conduct, finding that the negligent driver owed the child a duty
of care would do little to improve the driving habits of this defendant or of other drivers. Moreover, a nonexpert defendant should
not be required to recognize that his conduct eventually could harm
a child conceived years after the mother's injury. 4 Limiting the duty
to refrain from preconception negligence to those defendants
chargeable with expert medical knowledge thus would be consonant
with established tort principles that define a defendant's duty to
encompass only reasonably foreseeable harm.
DOUGLAS WILLIAM

EY,

JR.

63. By citing medical authorities on hemolitic diseases of newborns to determine that
the plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable, the court avoided the Sinkler dissent's
criticism that relying on the state of medical knowledge is unwarranted unless supported by
the record of the case. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
64. The refusal to impose a duty on nonexpert defendants in preconception negligence
cases is consistent with the court's willingness to impose a duty on nonexpert defendants in
prenatal negligence cases such as Smith v. Brennan and Sinkler v. Kneale, if one views each
case from a foreseeability standpoint. See note 29 supra. A person with ordinary knowledge
should recognize that if he injures a pregnant woman, her unborn child also might be harmed.
The nonexpert, however, should not be expected to foresee that his misconduct could injure
a child conceived years later.

